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hit lducticl
In this the *i I h. ve tried to describe the formation of British 
Laboor’s foreign policy between 1914 slid 1920. The four chapters in 
it have been an attempt to depict what I believe are the more important 
events in thrt formation. Because of the word-limit imposed on the 
O.hitt. thesis, I have offered very little analysis of these events 
in the chapt rs themselves. In the conclusion, however, I have 
assembled s veral of the more important of them and offered a brief 
interpretation of the effect they had on Labour’s foreign policy. I
*7'
have alee em hasieed in the conclusion two factors which, while not 
having a direct bearing on the actual formation of that policy, contri­
buted ‘.re- tly to it; unity within the Labour Party during the war, 
and the devoir • of Labour’s independence after the first Russian
Revolution.
In the bibliography of Lnglish Hi s tory« 1914-1949» A.J.P. Taylor 
has stated that most Labour memoirs are distinguished ... by their 
pedestrian quality and are best avoided” (p. 614;. After having con- 
ru'’ted a nui r of Labour biographies and autobiographies, most of 
which v/ere written in the 1920s and 1930s, I am very much in agreement 
wit r. Jai lor’s assessment of them. Not only are they pedestrian,
(ii)
(iii)
but for a study of Labour foreign policy they are desultory as well. 
Jhis is not to say that they are completely devoid of important infor­
mation about fcl war period. Indeed, I have drawn luite heavily 
from those concerning the major figurs in the Labour movement during 
this time - Henderson, Snowden, Olynes, MacDonald. The memoirs 
dealing with nore minor figures in the movement during the war, however 
have been almost entirely avoided. These include thememoirs of 
h. . ..->arnes, rnest Levin, J.H. L’homas, James Sexton and Janes Saxton.
because of the time element involved in writing the thesis. I
have had to rely more heavily on secondary source material than I 
would h?ve liked. I have not had time to consult Hansard for parlia­
mentary debates, nor have I been able to go through The limes. Uni.-n. ■ r - • •
doubtedly, both would have yielded a great deal of material which would 
have been extremely valuable to me. By way of clarification, it was 
impossible for m»-- to begin in earnest on my research before the first 
of October, 19&9*
host f the material used in the thesis was found in printed
sources at the British Museum, but l have also included a few items
from the Lloyd George Tapers at the Beaverbrook Library in London, 
where I was fortunate enough to be allowed to work for a week in
November.
A word needs to bn said about the source material for the 
Independent Labour Tarty. I decided to refrain from using lobert
.. -X ~ ____ —.... .J*- .
Dowse’s "book Left in the Centre, which is a concise history of the
I.L.P. between 1893 and 1940. His statements of fact are unreliable 
and I cannot agree with at least some of his opinions. I also find 
that Penner Brockway in Socialism over Sixty Years is particularly 
prejudiced in favour of the I.L.I., and in some instances he has even 
distorted or frailed to mention certain facts which would have given 
a different in ter pre at ion to that organisation’s history. Since 
that book and his other one on the I.L.P., Inside the Left, are major 
works on that organisation, however, I have had to draw quite heavily
from them.
I would like to thank Mr. Ruddock P. Mackay, of the Department 
of Modern History, University of St. Andrews, for reading my thesis and 
pointing out numerous difficulties in the rough draft. Also, I would 
like to thank th- Beaverbrook Library in London for permitting me
access to the ^loyd George Papers contained there.
CHAPTER I
PRE-WAR POLICY, THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY 
PRECEDING THE WAR, AND INITIAL REACTION AT ITS OUTBREAK
On the 27th February, 1900, at the Memorial Hall in Farringdon Street, 
London, a British Labour Party was founded under the auspices of the 
Trades Union Congress and three British socialist societies - the 
Independent Labour Party (i.L.P.), the Fabian Society, and the Social 
Democratic Federation (s.D.F.).^ The Labour Representation Committee 
(L.R.C.) was the name initially adopted by the party, but this was 
changed in 1906 to the Labour Party. From the beginning the new party 
was concerned primarily with the representation and protection of the
economic interests of the working class. That it should show little 
interest in foreign affairs at its inception was quite understandable. 
Its chief interest was in the area of social reform, and, consequently, 
all other matters of party policy were relegated to subordinate
positions.
At first the party’s foreign policy developed very slowly, being 
for the most part a continuation of "Gladstonian Liberalism". During 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, the working class had
1. The S.D.F. withdrew in 1901 after it had failed to persuade 
the other members of the organisation to adopt socialism as their 
ultimate goal.
<*
generally accepted the policy espoused by many of the more radical 
Liberals, namely, pacifism, human! tarianism, anti-militarism and anti­
imperialism. It was only natural that they should do so since the 
radicals tended to be strong advocates of social reform. The foreign 
policy of the Conservatives coupled with high expenditure on armaments 
was hardly the kind of policy which could be expected to appeal to a 
class predominantly interested in social reform.
Mien the L.R.C. was founded in 1900, the Liberal Party had just 
split over its attitude toward the Boer War. Kruger’s ultimatum on 
11th October, 1899, demanding the withdrawal of British troops from 
along the frontiers of the Boer Republics, had initiated the conflict. 
The Conservatives immediately threw their support behind the war, but 
the Liberals split into "Liberal Imperialists" and "pro-Boers", the 
latter group drawing a number of Liberal Unionists into its ranks. Poi 
the most part Labour, too, sided with the Boers and denounced the im­
perialistic war being waged in South Africa. The I.L.P. led the 
attack of the L.R.C. on the Government’s policy, passing at its own 
annual conference in 1900 resolutions against imperialism, militarism 
and conscription, and declaring itself at its 1901 and 1902 conferences 
to be definitely pro-Boer. It regarded the war as an example of the 
then accepted theoiy of Socialism that all wars were caused by capital­
ists seeking to obtain profits. Therefore, the I.L.P. criticised the
- 2 -
Government’s action and actively opposed its policy of war in South
- 3 -
Africa.1
But Labour was not unanimously on the side of the Boers. The
majority of an important section of the L.R.C., the Fabian Society,
hoped for a British victoiy. According to the society’s historian,
Edward Pease, ’’The majority of the Society recognized that the British
£Jnpire had to win the war, and that no other conclusion to it was 
2possible." While such prominent Fabians as Ramsay MacDonald, J .F. 
Green and G.N. Barnes were avid Boer supporters, still the bulk of the 
society followed the lead of the "old guard" Fabians, Sidney Webb, 
Bernard Shaw and Paul Bland, in supporting the Government’s war effort. 
True, the society criticized the mistakes of policy which had preceded 
the war, accusing with equal enmity the British capitalists and Kruger 
for bringing on the conflict. Now that the war had begun, however, it 
had to be fought to a successful conclusion. Nevertheless, the 
Fabians did recommend that at the end of the war, far-reaching adminis­
trative reforms should be made: the South African mines should be take
over by the British Government, but South Africa should be granted wide 
powers of self-government.^ 1 2 3
1. M. Beer, A History of British Socialism, Vol. I (London: G. Bell 
and Sons, Ltd., 1920), pp. 327-29$ A.M. McBriar, Fabian Socialism 
and English Politics, 1884-1913 (Cambridge: At The University Press, 
1962), pp• 305-6 $ Edward R. Pease, The Hisbiy of the Fabian Society 
3rd Edn. (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., I963), p. 129.
2. Ibid., p. 128.
3. McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English PiLitios, 1884-1918, p. 128.
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At the end of the war, Labour was still not interested enough 
in foreign affairs to work out a policy of its own. In fact the 
party's manifesto for the general election in 1906 devoted only half 
of a sentence to foreign affairs. "It was this: ’Wars are fought to 
make the rich richer; . • • When the leader of the "pro-Boer"
Liberals, Campbell-Bannerman, became Prime Minister in 1905, Labour 
felt that it could support without any qualms the Liberals’ foreign 
policy. Despite the fact that Grey and Haldane, two former supporters 
of the war, were in the Cabinet as foreign Secretary and Secretary of 
War respectively, Labour was confident that the Liberals would stress 
social and fiscal reform, and that, for its own part, it need not worry 
about an antagonistic foreign policy as long as Campbell-Bannerman was 
Prime Minister. While Labour M.P.s were certainly outspoken on 
foreign affairs in the 1906 parliament, for the most part their speeche 
echoed the policy of their former pro-Boer allies.
Campbell-Bannerman had been able to reunite the Liberals over the 
issue of protection in 1905, but he had not been able to reconcile the 
differences of opinion in the party over fundamental principles of 
foreign policy. He continued for a time to head the "radical” Liberal 
section of the party, but when Asquith succeeded him in 1909, this 
group was left without a leader. They continued to advocate their
1. A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers> Dissent over Foreign Policy, 
1792-1939, Panther Edn.' (London: Panther Books, 1969), P» 95 •
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own foreign policy, which in time came largely to centre around the 
amelioration of Germany’s economic grievances. Furthermore, they 
became increasingly hostile toward Czarist Russia, particularly after 
Britain extended her Entente with France to include that country, too.
Because of their traditional antipathy towards the balance of power 
concept, the radicals were determined to weaken this new alliance.
Thus, non-involvement in European affairs came to be one of the chief
tenets of their programme.
The Labour Party supported muchcf the radical Liberals’ foreign 
policy. ^n The Trouble Makers A.J.P. Taylor has said that generally 
speaking he agrees with the opinion expressed by Clement Attlee many 
years later in The Labour Party in Perspectives ’’’The party . . . had 
no real constructive foreign policy, but shared the views which were 
traditional in radical circles.’” It was anti-imperialist and like 
the radicals had opposed the Boer War. It was anti-militariet and was 
pleased when Asquith was able to cut the military and naval estimates ir 
1906 and 19O7« Antagonism toward Russian despotism was a tenet of 
working-class faith, and Labour could support the radicals here.
Labour’s primary point of disagrement with the radicals’ foreign 
policy, however, was over the question of involvement in European affaii 
Like the radicals, Labour was against the balance of power concept, and 
was therefore willing to see the Entente undermined. But it was still 
interested in European affairs, particularly as they were related to the
- 6 -
Second International.^ In place of the radicals’ non-involvement
policy, Labour substituted internationalism, based on the socialist
doctrines articulated by the International. In 1904 the L.H.C. had
applied for membership of this organization. The three leading
socialist bodies in Britain - the I.L.P., the S.D.F. and the Fabian
Society - were already members of it. While the L.H.C. was not
specifically dedicated to the cause of socialism, still it was allowed
to join the International on the grounds that it was carrying out the
olass struggle despite the fact that it had not declared itself to be 
2in favour of socialism.
From the beginning tte Irtemational had concerned itself with the 
question of the prevention of war. At its conferences in 1891, 1893, 
1896 and 1900, it had begun to outline a programme designed for just 
such a purpose. Finally, it had taken the question under serious 
consideration at its conferences at Stuttgart in 1907 and Copenhagen 
in 1910. At the Copenhagen Conference, Keir Hardie, the leader of 
the British section of the International, had moved a resolution which 
called for a general strike by the workers of all countries if the 
threat of war should appear. The resolution had been defeated, but a
1. The Second International was founded in 1®9 as the successor to th 
First International - formerly the old Communist League - which had 
been constructed in 1864 but was dissolved in the early 1870s.
2. Taylor, The Trouble Makers, p. 97 J H.W. Postgate, The Internetion 
during the War (London: The Herald, 1918), PP» 1-31 G.D.H. Cole, A 
History of the Labour Party from 1914, 3d. reprint (London: Houtledg 
and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1969 J, P• 6.
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similar, though more ambiguous one drafted by the French socialist, 
Jaures, had passed. This resolution had stated that it was the duty
of the working class should war threaten in Europe to attempt to 
prevent it by any means that seemed appropriate. If war should start, 
however, then they should bring it promptly to an end (the resolution 
did not state how) and then exploit the political and economic chaos 
resulting from it in their respective countries to hasten the downfall 
of capitalism.^
This was the resolution that was in force at the time of the
beginning of the Great War, the resolution upon which British Labour 
had in part based its foreign policy. A conference had been held in 
Basle in 1912 in an attempt to redefine more explicitly just what cours< 
the International should take in the event of war; but it had merely 
referred the question to committees of the individual groups represente< 
there. They were to have studied the question and submitted their
recommendations to the conference scheduled to meet in Vienna in the
latter part of August 1914* Before the Vienna Conference was convened; 
however, the war began.
• • • • •
The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in June 1914, and 
Austria’s subsequent ultimatum to Serbia on the 23rd of July and her
1. Postgate, The International during the War, pp. 4-6.
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declaration of war on the 25th set in motion a chain of events which 
culminated in the start of the Great War. On July 28th the British 
Socialist Party (actually the S.D.F., which had been reconstructed in 
1912) became the first political body in Britain to pass a resolution 
protesting against the Austrian Note and that country’s later declara­
tion of war. The resolution went on to congratulate the Continental 
socialists on their efforts to maintain peace. The following day the 
International Socialist Bureau (i.S.B.) in Brussels issued a declaration 
on behalf of the Second International which attempted to rally the 
socialists and working classes in the countries concerned. It called 
on them to carry out the Copenhagen Resolution by strengthening their 
demonstrations against war and pressing their governments to call upon 
Austria and Serbia to settle their dispute through arbitration.'1'
On July 30th Labour’s M.P.s met and passed unanimously a resolutic 
expressing gratitude to Sir Edward Grey for taking steps aimed at gettir 
Austria and Serbia to settle their dispute peacefully. At the same 
time they expressed the party’s desire to remain neutral in the event oi 
a general European conflict. Two days later Keir Hardie and Arthur 
Henderson, the President and Secretary of the British section of the 
International respectively, issued a manifesto to the British people 
calling upon them to ’’’Hold vast demonstrations against war in every 
industrial centre.”* This injunction was duly carried out the next deg
1. G.B.H. Cole, Labour in War-Time (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 
1915), PP* 22-24; Beer, A History of British Socialism, I, p. 385•
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August 2nd, the most impressive demonstration being held at Trafalgar 
Square. At the demonstration a resolution was passed protesting 
”’against any step being taken by the Government of this country to 
support Russia’” and calling upon the Jovemment to remain neutral in 
the event of a European war. While Britain herself should not partici­
pate, she should strive to restore peace on the Continent as quickly as 
possible. Undoubtedly, to many of the spectators the demonstration 
must have seemed quite a momentous occasion. To Beatrice Webb, however 
it was nothing more than an ’’undignified and futile exhibition”.1
The following day Ramsay MacDonald, the Chairman of the Parlia­
mentary Labour Party (PjL.P.), stated Labour’s position in the House of 
Commons. At the time of his speech, the country was not aware of 
Germany’s invasion of Belgium and, consequently, the party gave its taci 
approval as he told the other parties that whatever happened the country 
ought to remain neutral. When Germany’s violation of Belgium was known 
however, the majority of the Labour movement gradually came round to the 
Government’s position.
But why should the majority of the Labour movement consent to 
support a European war when it had been so emphatically against the Boei 
War just fifteen years earlier? Was it the moral issue of Belgian
1. G.D.H. Cole, Labour in War-Time, pp. 24-25? Mary Agnes Hamilton, 
Arthur Henderson (London? William Heinemann, Ltd., 1938), P* 94» 
Margaret I. Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb’s Diaries^ 1912-1924 (Londons 
Longmans, Green and Co•, Ltd., 1952), p. 25•
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neutrality and the sanctity of international law which had now been 
violated by Germany*s invasion that drew the party into the conflict; 
or was it the imagined, or possibly real, threat to Britain herself 
which evoked from Labour this response? The moral issue was the one
seized upon by the leaders of the party and the trade union movement. 
Arthur Henderson, Harry Gosling, J.A. Seddon, W.A. Appleton, Ben Tilletl 
and numerous other Labour leaders wrote pamphlets and gave interviews 
to the news media during the course of the war in which they damned 
Prussianism and pledged British Labour to avenge Germany’s violation of 
Belgium. Indeed, the impression given by most of these leaders during 
the early part of the war was that Labour was fighting solely to restore 
Belgium and destroy Prussian militarism.
But at least one Labourite, G.D.H. Cole, saw the party’s pro-war 
stance as being justified not on moral grounds, but on the grounds of 
national survival. According to him it was not the righteousness of 
the cause which drew Labour into the conflict, but the fact that the 
national existence was threatened. Thus, the difference between
Labour’s attitude toward the Boer War and its attitude toward the Great
War was not attributable to moral scruples, as he saw it, but to the 
actual threat in the present instance to the very existence ofthe State,
1. Gp. cit.» pp. 6-7. For trade union opinion as to the origins of 
the war and Germany’s sole responsibility for perpetrating it see the 
following:- Arthur Henderson, Prussian Militarism (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1917), Harry Gosling, Peace: How to Get and Keep it (Lon­
don: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 191?)» J*A. Seddon, Why British Labour 
Supports /.........
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Great Britain officially declared war on Germany at 11.0 p.m. 
on August 4th, 1914* The next day, the National Executive Committee 
(N.E.C.) and the P.L.P. met and decided to support the war effort.
The party*s support, nevertheless, was qualified: ”* We condemn the 
policy which has produced the war, we do not obstruct the war effort, 
but our duty is to secure peace at the earliest possible moment.’”
On August 3rd, Grey told the members of the House of Commons that in 
his opinion Britain was morally bound to come to the aid of Prance and 
Russia in the event of a European war. Labour had always been opposed 
to secret diplomacy, the policy which had apparently involved the 
country in war. The support which the P.L.P. now decided to offer 
the Government might in fact be deemed ’’negative” support. All that 
it definitely committed itself to wa3 not to ’’obstruot the war effort”. 
When MacDonald as Chairman ofthe P.L.P. asked that body for permission 
to read its statement on the war the next day in the House of Commons, 
however, his request was refused. Therefore, he resigned his position 
and Arthur Henderson was elected the new Chairman.1
Two days after the P.L.P.’s initial statement on the war, the 
N.E.C. issued a circular which further qualified the party’s position. 
It reiterated its condemnation of Grey and the Government’s foreign
... Supports the War (London: 1917); W.A. Appleton,
The Workers Resolve (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1917); Ben 
Tillett, Who was Responsible for the War - and Why? (London:
1917).
1. Lord Elton, The Life of James Ramsay MacDonald (London: Collins, 
1939), PP- 248-49.
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policy and declared that it would seek to procure peace at the earliest 
possible moment. The N.B.C. also declared that in the meantime it woul 
attempt to cariy out the resolutions passed at a joint meeting of Labour 
organisations on the 5th which were aimed at mitigating the ’’’destitu­
tion which will inevitably overtake our working people while the state 
of war lasts’”.^
Before war had actually been declared, the Joint Board of the 
Labour Party - the N.E.C., the Trades Union Congress (T.U.C.), and the 
General Federation of Trade Unions (G.F.T.U.) - had summoned a represen­
tative conference of the important sections of the party for the purpose 
of forming a National Labour Peace Emergency Committee to carry on
agitation against British intervention. War was declared, however, 
before the committee could meet for its intended purpose; and, when 
it did finally meet on August 6th, its character was changed from that 
of a peaoe committee to one of a war relief committee. The War Emer­
gency Workers’ National Committee (W.E.W.N.C.) was concerned first and 
foremost with the protection of Labour’s economic interests. Because 
it concentrated on domestic problems instead of dealing with issues of 
foreign policy, it played an important rele in helping to maintain 
unity within the party. Its executive committee was composed of member 
who represented the widest possible range of views in the Labour Party. 
Henderson, MacDonald, Webb, Hyndman, Hmillie were all members of the
1. G.D.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914> pp• 18-19<'
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executive; and it was largely because of the existence of this 
committee that the cleavage which did develop in the party during the 
war over foreign policy issues never reached the magnitude that it did 
within the labour and socialist parties on the continent. The W.E.W.N. 
met periodically for the first year and a half - weekly until the end 
of the/f?14 and fortnightly during the next twelve months - to discuss 
the domestic hardships which the war was inflicting upon the workers
at home.'
During the years immediately preceding the war, industrial unrest
had resulted in a tremendous increase in strikes throughout the country
When the war came, a great many of these disputes still remained un­
settled, and they would undoubtely hamper the military effort con­
siderably. Realizing this, the Joint Board called a special conferenc< 
on August 24th. An ’’industrial truce” was agreed upon by which all 
existing trade disputes were to be terminated immediately. further­
more, it was agreed that a serious attempt should be made to settle
amicably any new disputes which might arise before resorting to a strik 
' 2The truce in effect sent hundreds of thousands of men back to work.
About the same time that the industrial truce was agreed upon,
1. G.D.H. Cole, Labour in War-Time, pp. 27-28; Margaret I. Cole, The 
Story of Fabian Socialism (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1961 
p. 163; Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, p. 100; Elton, The Life of Jame 
Ramsay MacDonald, p. 308; William Aylott Orton, Labour in Transition 
(London; PhilipAllan & Co., Ltd., 1931), p* 14«
2. G.D.H. Cole, Labour in 'War-Time, p. 44; J-H» Clynes, Memoirs. 1869 
1924. Vol. I (Londons Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1937, P« 180.
- 14 -
the Government decided that a Parliamentary Recruiting Campaign should 
be launched. On August 29th the N.E.C. endorsed the party’s participa­
tion in such a campaign. The day before, Arthur Henderson had received 
a letter from the Prime Minister asking that Labour join with the 
Liberals and Unionists ’’’for the purpose of enlisting recruits - which 
is the urgent necessity of the moment’'’. He had submitted the proposal 
to the P.L.P. that same day, and they had agreed that the Party Whips 
should co-operate in a recruiting campaign. Now, on the 29th, the 
N.E.C. was simply endorsing the earlier action of the P.L.P. It did 
go one step further, however, and agreed "to place the Head Office 
organization at the disposal of the campaign".
Henderson was to be a joint president of the Recruiting Campaign
Committee along with Asquith and Bonar Law. Three other Labourites 
were also to serve on the committee: P.W. Goldstone, M.P.; J. Parker, 
M.P.j and Arthur Peters, the party’s National Agent. The I.L.P. of 
course was bitterly opposed to the idea. Jowett and his colleagues 
later came to view the recruiting campaign as an attempt to compromise 
the Labour movement and prepare the public for conscription. On the 
same day that it endorsed the campaign, the N.E.C. also agreed to an
electoral truce, consenting "not to contest any vacancies that might
♦*
arise during the continuance of the war, but that each seat thus fallen
vacant should be retained by the Party to which the late Member belonged
1. G.B.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914? p» 20; Peter 
Stansky (ed.), The Left and War: The British Labour Party and World 
War /.........
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Early in the war the Joint Board of the Labour Party stated its 
position in a pamphlet entitled The British Labour Movement and the 
War. The pamphlet was published on September 3rd, 1914, and included 
a declaration by the Board itself and individual manifestos by the 
T.U.C. and the G.F.T.U. The joint declaration stated that, "in order 
to clear away 2S*ani-AisconceP‘ti°ns once and for all, we place on record 
what the policy of the Movement has been, why the policy was adopted, 
and what the Movement has done to carry out its policy.”
While the British Labour movement had always stood for peace, and 
while it had constantly striven to promote friendly relations between 
Britain and Germany, still the military caste in that countiy had been 
bent on war if the rest of Europe could not be cowed into submission to 
its demands. Germany, throujh the deliberate act of the Kaiser, had
rejected Britain’s proposal that a conference of the European powers 
should be held to deal with the dispute between Austria and Serbia and 
had gone rapidly on to prepare for the invasion of France.
British Labour recognized the threat to European deomcracy posed 
by German aggression. If Britain had not stood by Belgium, it was 
argued, Germany would probably have won in the first few days of the 
conflict, and this would have meant "the death of democracy in Europe". 
Germany’s dominance in Europe would have crushed working-class aspirati 
there for greater political and economic power. "Democratic ideals
cannot thrive in a state where militarism is dominant; and the militar
state with a subservient and powerless working class is the avowed
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political ideal of the German ruling caste.”
The declaration went on to state that the Pariiamentary Recruiting
Campaign had been heartily endorsed by the Parliamentary Committee of 
the T.U.C., which Represented the overwhelming majority of the trade 
unionists of the country. Labour had responded to the challenge to 
rise up and defeat military despotism. When the time came for peace, 
’’the Labour movement ^would/stand, as it always stood, for an inter­
national agreement among all civilized nations that disputes and mis­
understandings in the future /should/ be settled not by machine guns but 
by arbitration.” The declaration was signed by numerous Labour M.P.s, 
The Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C., and the Management Committee
of the G.F.T.U.
Following the declaration of the Joint Board came a manifesto 
entitled "Trade Unions and the War,” issued by the G.F.T.U. to its 
members and affiliations in Europe and America. It stated that the 
GF.T.U. was now and always had been on the side of international as well 
as industrial peace. The manifesto did not attempt to "analyse and 
discuss the causes of the war and the responsibility for its outbreak”,
(note continued from p. 14) ••• War I (New Yorks Oxford University
Press, 1969), pp. 153-54? Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, p. 99, Archi­
bald Fenner Brockway, Socialism Over Sixty Years: The Life of Jowett 
(1094-1944) (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1948), p. 140*
1. Among the M.P.s were G.N. Barnes, J.H. Clynes, W. Crooks, A. Hender­
son, J. Hodge and W.S. Sanders. For the Parliamentary Committee of 
the T.U.C., J.A. Seddon, H. Gosling and J. Sexton were among those 
signing the declaration. Among those endorsing it for the G.F.T.U. 
were J.N. Bell, Ben Cooper, Ben Tillett, and W.A. Appleton.
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but it did say that it was in no way incident upon the policy or 
conduct of Great Britain. That country was fighting not only for 
Belgium, but also for the honour of all nations and the inviolability
of treaties.
The manifesto went on to declare that while the problems of 
national defence in Britain were of extreme importance# those which 
affected the political and economic life of the State were, too. war 
had ’’compelled the Government to give practical effect to the admission, 
long made verbally, that the state was responsible for the physical 
efficiency of its units, and measures of relief have to be planned.”
Next, the G.F.T.U. called for bigger sacrifices from those member 
of the “comfortable class” and asked the Governneit to make better
provision for soldiers and their dependents. The Army should be 
reformed, particularly in regard to increasing allowances and facili­
tating promotion within the ranks. The G.F.T.U. believed in a volun­
tary army, and while it did not say so explicitly, it indicated that it 
would oppose conscription. Finally, while it believed in helping
workers in other lands and was devoted to the cause of internationalism
still for the time being its efforts had to be concentrated at home.
The manifesto of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union
Congress came next in the pamphlet and was addressed “To The Trade 
Unionists of The Country. To The Officials and Members of Affiliated 
Societies." It stated that the Parliamentary Committee was grateful
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for the way ’’the Labour Party in the House of Commons had responded to 
the appeal made to all parties to give their co-operation in securing 
the enlistment of men to defend the interests of their country1'; and, 
it readily gave its endorsement to the Labour members selected to serve 
on the Parliamentary Recruiting Campaign and to ’’the placing of the 
services of the National A ent at the disposal of that Committee to 
assist in carrying through its secretarial work”.
The T.U.C. adopted a slightly different attitude to conscription
from that of the G.F.T.U.. While the G.F.T.U. had inferred that it
would be opposed to it, the T.U.C. recognized that should the voluntary 
system of military service fail, the forces in favour of compulsory 
military service might ’’prove to be so persistent and strong as to 
become irresistible”. This threat with all its accompanying evils 
should, therefore, be enough to ’’stimulate the manhood of the nation to 
come forward in its defence”. The manifesto did not imply that the 
T.U.C. would support conscription should it become necessary, but, 
rather, seemed to leave the question open. The most important thing 
for the trade unions to realize was that on the outcome of the struggle
rested ’’the preservation and maintenance of free and unfettered demo­
cratic government”. While the T.U.C. manifesto did not categorically
list the areas in which the Government should assist the workers and
soldiers and their dependents as did the G.F.T.U. one, still it declare*
that while the citizens had a duty to the State, the State likewise had
- 19 -
a duty to its citizens.1
By the middle of October most of the official Labour movement 
was supporting the war effort. The Labour M.P.s in conjunction with 
the T.U.C., the G.F.T.U. and other Labour leaders cane out clearly in 
favour of the war on October 15th when they issued a manifesto stating 
the party’s position toward the conflict. The party placed the 
entire blame for the war on the German Government. It depicted the
war as one of democracy agairdt military despotism and endorsed the
2party’s fullest participation in the Government’s reoruiting campaign.
while the official Labour Party had spoken unequivocally in favou 
of the war, the rank and file remained silent during the early months 
of the conflict. The unions themselves were primarily concerned with 
protecting their own economic interests as best they could. The T.U.C 
and the G.F.T.U., while they had taken an active part in forming the 
position Labour had adopted toward the war, were primarily concerned 
with co-ordinating the activities of the individual unions. Since the 
T.U.C. conference which was to have met on August 13th had been 
postponed, the opinions which were circulating within the trade unions 
themselves were for the time being muted.1 * 2 3
1* The British Labour Movement, and the War t a pamphlet issued by the 
Joint Board of the Labour Party on September 3^J, 1914 (Londons 
Harrison and Sons, Ltd., 1915)*
2. Orton, Labour in Transition, p. 19$ Cole, A llistozy of the Labour 
Party from 1514> p* 21.
3. Cole, Labour in War-Time, pp. 41-43*
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The Fabian Society during the early days of the war made no 
pronouncement on it. In fact it looked for a while as if the society 
was going to split. The majority of the Fabians eventually came out 
in support of the war effort though a declaration to that effect was 
never made by the society. A considerable minority, however, fallowed 
the lead of the society’s I.L.P. members and opposed it.^ This 
diversity within the society was tolerated only because the Fabians 
had always been much more concerned with domestic affairs rather than 
foreign policy.
The I.L.P. on the other hand came out quite early in definite 
opposition to the war. Because of the anti-war stance which it took>
the party suffered a heavy loss in its membership. It was estimated 
that during the first few months of the war nearly one fifth of its
membership left it to support the pro-war attitude of the majority of
2the Labour movement. The I.L.P. was to a great extent composed of 
working-class members most of whom probably felt a much stronger 
allegiance to their individual unions than they did to the party.
item say MacDonald’s early criticism in the House of Commons of 
Grey and the Government’s foreign policy, and a later article printed 
on August 13th in the Labour Leader entitled "Why We Are At War", ralli
1. M. Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, p. 166} G.D.H. Cole, Labou 
in ^-ar-Time, p. 34.
2. Archibald Fenner Brockway, Inside the Left? Thirty Years of Platfo 
Press, Prison and Parliament (London: George Allen &, Unwin, Ltd.,
1942), p. 47.
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the I.L.P. around him. Not only did the I.L.P. members feel as he
did about the war, but they sympathized with him when the press res­
ponding to his remarks launched a barrage of vituperate criticism at 
him. Sven Fred Jowett, who had disagreed with MacDonald before the 
war over the question of Labour’s backing of the Liberal Government, 
now gave him his support.1
On August 13th the I.L.P. became the first political organizatior 
in Britain to come out in direct opposition to the war by issuing a
manifesto on behalf of International Socialism. The manifesto con­
demned the iresponsible foreign policy pursued by the Government, 
particularly the doctrine of the balance of power and the armaments 
race. It went on to extend its sympathy and greeting to the German 
Socialists’” who had laboured with them before the war to promote good
relations between the two countries. The war had sealed the doom of
the rulers, the diplomats and the militarists of the belligerent
countries who had brought it on. In conclusion the manifesto echoed
the now hollow notes of international solidarity! ’’’Long live Freedom 
2and Fraternity! Long live International Socialism!”'
Two Parliamentary members of the I.L.P., J.H. Clynes and James 
Parker, dissented from the party’s position as set forth in the 
manifesto. There were only seven I.L.P. M.P.s in all, and the fact 
that two of them became pro-war advocates despite their strong social!
1• Ibid», p• 45*
2. G.D.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914* pp* 19-20.
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leanings gives some indication of the intensity of the conflict of 
ideals which confronted British socialists during the war. With this 
in mind, Fred Jowett, the Chairman of the I.L.P., and Bruce Glasier, 
the party’s Secretary, campaigned throughout the country during the 
early months of the war. Jowett apparently saw that it was useless 
to try to stop the war in its early stages, and, therefore, he deter­
mined that the first thing which should be done was to secure I.L.P. 
unity.^ In May 1915 Beatrice Webb would write that the organisation 
had probably lost 10,000 working-class members, nearly a third of its 
membership. Unity within the ranks of the I.L.P. was the first thing 
that must be secured. When that had been achieved, the party would 
then be able to begin its anti-war propaganda. In fact the party’s 
propaganda machine seems to have been temporarily halted, or at least 
slowed down, until the Norwich Convention in the spring of 1915*
But what were the principles espoused by the I.L.P. during the 
war; Bamsay MacDonald writing in 1920 mentioned four basic ones to 
which the party had devoted itself. It was concerned with civil 
liberty within the country itself and the rights of the individual 
soldier, whether at home or abroad. Furthermore, the I.L.P. believed 
that the diplomatic powers of the Government should be exercised to 
achieve peace as well as the military ones. Finally, the party had 
sought to prevent the growth of national hatred within Britain “because
1. Brockway, Socialism over Sixty Years, pp. 131, 133-
■ •' - - - -
- 23 -
that would prolong the war, submerge its real purposes and causes, and 
produce a military peace which would be no peace*” According to 
MacDonald, these were the four principles which the I.L.P* fought for 
during the war3
While the I.L.P. generally agreed on these principles, still its
attitude toward the war itself was diverse. In fact the anti-war
position of the I.L.P. was quite diverse. Within the organisation
were many nuances of opinion ranging all the way from those who were
purely pacifist to those who believed in national defence but deprecatoc
the apparent duplicity of theGovernment’s policy prior to the war.
Jowett was of the latter opinion. He acknowledged the moral obligatioi
of Britain to support Prance because of secret understanding with that
country, but he argued that those who had opposed that policy were not 
2now bound to support the Government. While the I.L.P. was divided as 
far as its attitude toward the war went, the fact remains that it was 
the only political party in Britain to oppose the war from the beginning
It is now necessary to look at two groups which, while not 
affiliated with the ^abour Party at the start of the war, were neverthe­
less to play an important part ir^the formation of its foreign policy 
both during and after the war. The first of these, the British
1. J. Hamsay MacDonald, The History of the I.L.P. (London: National 
Labour Press, 1920), pp. 17-18.
2. Brockway, Socialism over Sixty Years, pp. 131-32.
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Socialit Party (B.S.P*), was a definitely political organisation of 
strong revolutionary, Marxist leanings* The second, the Union of 
Democratic Control (U.D.C.), was not really a political body in the tru< 
sense of the word. Initially comprised of dissident Liberals and a 
few left-wing Labourites, it captured the allegiance of a vast number 
of trade unions and local Labour parties during the latter part of
the war.
While not actually affiliated with the Labour Party at the 
beginning of the war, the B.S.P. had applied for membership in it early 
in 1914* It was not until the Manchester Conference in 1917 that its 
application was finally accepted. In 1913 the B.S.P. had split over 
the question of national defence. This split had been patched up the 
same year with the result that those in favour of national defence were
left in almost exclusive control of the executive committee of the
party. H.M. Hyndman was the leader of this group. While he and his 
followers favoured such a position, nevertheless they hesitated at the 
beginning of the war to come out in support of the Government. The
B.S.P. was a member of the Second International and its members had
placed their hopes in its ability to prevent war. When the Inter­
national failed to do this, however, an, when it did not take immediate
action to try to bring the war to a rapid conclusion, the party 
executive came out in wholehearted support of an Allied victory.
Un August 12th the executive of the B.S.P. issued a manifesto
supporting Britain’s entry into the war. It stated, however, that thi
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was not a “war of the people”. The German workers had declared 
vehemently against the war, and it was hoped that the socialists in 
Germany would take a stand against their Government. Surprisingly 
enough this first pro-war declaration was not challenged by either 
Albert Inkpin or S.C. Fairchild, both members of the executive who were
later to become the chief anti-war critics in the party after it ,,^Iit 
in 1916.
A stronger declaration of the party’s support for the war was 
issued on September 15th. This manifesto recognized the threat of 
Prussian militarism to the country and strongly advised its members to 
support the recruiting campaign which was just getting under way. It 
drew a storm of protest from most of the local branches of the B.3.P., 
and thus began the internal strife within the party.4'
The Union of democratic Control was largely the result of pre-war 
criticism of the Government’s foreign policy by radical Liberals.
S.L. Morel, a Liberal journalist, Charles Trevelyan, a subordinate 
member of the Government, Arthur Ponsody, a Liberal aristocrat, had 
all been critics of their party’s policy. After a number of meetings 
at Trevelyan’s home during the early days of the war, these radicals 
along with Ramsay Macdonald and Norman Angell issued a private circular 
letter in August to a number of persons whom they thought might be 
interested in the peace programme they had just worked out. The
1. Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, 19QO-21 
(London: We id enf eld and NicoIson, 1969), PP* Q3-88.
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circular was followed in September by a public letter issued to the
press listing what the Union considered to be the four conditions on
which peace should be established and appealing for financial support to 
1
help with the expenses incurred in the advocacy of such a policy.
The first general meeting of the U.D.C. was held on November 17th,
1914* At its founding the organisation reported a membership of
5,000 and various affiliations including twenty branches of the I.L.P.
and sundiy trade union organisations. The Union’s primary efforts were
to be directed toward the permeation of Trade Councils and local Labour
parties. By the fall of 1915 it had secured the affiliation of about
thirty of these Trade and Labour Councils and local Labour parties
with twenty-six others having the question under consideration; and by
October, 1913, the membership of the Labour organizations affiliated to
it was nearly 650,000. The first executive committee of the Union
included Ramsay MacDonald as chairman, E.D. Morel as secretary, Charles
Trevelyan, Norman Angell, Arthur Ponsonby, J.A. Hobson and Mrs. Barbara
Mackenzie. Other early supporters of the U.D.C. included Bertrand
Russell, H.N. Brailsford, Arthur Henderson, Fred Jowett, and .V.C. Ander- 
2son.
Shortly after its founding a declaration of policy embodying the
1. Charles Trevelyan, The Union of Democratic Control? Its History 
and Its Policy (London: S im so n & Co., Ltd., 1919)>PP* 2-4•
2. H. Swanwick, Builders of Peace? Being a Ten Year History of the
Union of Democratic Control <London: Press, L+J.,
1924), pp. 36, 51-52• Trevelyan, The Union of Democratic Control, p.
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four cardinal principles of the Union was issued and it read as follows
To secure for ourselves and the generations that succeed 
us, a new course of policy which will prevent a similar cata­
strophe to this present war ever again befalling our Empire.
The four cardinal points in the Union’s policy are as followss-
1. No Province shall be transferred from one Government to 
another without the consent by plebiscite or otherwise, of 
the population of such province.
2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking, shall be entered 
upon in the name of Great Britain without the saction of 
Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic 
control of foreign policy shall be created.
3. The foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at 
creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the 
Balance of Power, but shall be directed to concerted action 
between the Powers, and the setting up of an International 
Council, whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, 
with such machinery for securing International agreement
as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace.
4* Great Britain shall propose, as part of the Peace settle­
ment, a plan for the drastic reduction, by consent, of the 
armaments of all the belligerents to secure the general 
nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments, and the ? 
control of export of armaments by one country to another.
The U.D.C. was not at its inception a political party nor did it
ever attempt to become one. Its sole purpose was ”to create and infon 
2
public opinion". It was initially created for the purpose of correct­
ing the maladies of British foreign policy. During the war it tried 
to dissuade national opinion away from the idea of a ’’Knockout Blow” 
to that of a negotiated peace. Through its efforts to form public 
opinion, it played an important role in moderating the policies of the
1. Trevelyan, The Union of democratic Control, pp. 4-5*
2. Ibid., p. 9-
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I.L.P., moulding that party into a democratic, pacifist organisation 
instead of allowing it to become a revolutionary one. The I.L.P. came 
virtually to adopt the four cardinal points of the U.D.C. At the same 
time the Union’s influence in the country was greatly reinforced by 
its association with the I.L.P.^
The Union encompassed every aspect of war opinion. Catherine
Ann Cline in Keo.ru.its to Labour has given a lucid description of the
many nuances of opinion within it;-
Membership in the U.D.C. did not imply adherence to any 
one of the various shades of pacifist opinion nor indeed to 
pacifism at all. Arthur Ponsonby considered all war immoral 
while Norman Angell considered it irrational. Another member, 
Bertrand Russell, held that while some wars might be justified 
by their possible consequences (as in the case of the American 
Civil Wary, no worthwhile issue was then at stake. Morel based 
his opposition on causes rather than consequences, maintaining 
that England’s guilt was at least equal to Germany’s- Some 
members of the U.D.C., however, not only supported the war but 
actively participated in it. H.B. Lees-Smith, a university 
professor and Liberal M.P., served at the front as a corporal, 
and William Arnold-Porster, of a family whose members were 
politically prominent in both Liberal and Conservative govern­
ments, served as a lieutenant-commander in the navy and helped 
to direct the blockade of Germany- 1 2
While there was this diversity of opinion, still all the members agreec 
that secret diplomacy had been one of the primary causes of the war. 
Therefore, they sought to secure the democratic control of foreign polj 
which would insure in the future ’’that the nation would never again fii 
itself involuntarily committed to war:'.^
1. Trevelyan, The Union of Democratic Control, p. 9J Brockway, Insid< 
the Left, p. 55J T.P. Conwell-Bvens, Foreign Policy from a Back Bene 
1904-19IQ (London: Oxford University Press7 1932), p. 136.
2. Catherine Ann Cline, Recruits to Labour: The British Labour Party.
1914-1931 (Syracuse: Syracuse 'University Press, 19^3), p. 11.
3- Ibid., p. 12.
CHAPTER II
PRO-WAR AND ANTI-WAR POLICY AND OPINION:
FROM THE FIRST INTER-ALLIED SOCIALIST
CONFERENCE TO THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
The Labour Party Conference scheduled for January, 1915, was postponed 
until the following year. In February, however, an inter-Allied
socialist conference was held in London. This was the first of four
such conferences to be held during the war, and it followed a meeting 
of the Dutch and Scandinavian socialist parties in Copenhagen the month 
before. While the Copenhagen Conference had claimed to be a meeting 
of neutral socialist parties, the inter-Allied socialists denounced it 
as being pro-German. They now met in London to make their own pronounc 
ments on the war, and the resolutions which they passed reflected a
compromise between the pro-war and anti-war groups gathered there.
The invasion of France and Belgium was condemned, but it 
was emphasized that the Allied socialists were at war only with 
the governments and not the people of the Central Powers. They 
stood for the liberation of Belgium and Poland and for the 
right of all forcibly annexed peoples, from Alsace-Lorraine to 
the Balkans, freely to dispose of themselves. A resolve to 
fight to victory over Germany, characterized as the worst enemy 
of freedom, was coupled with a determination that the defensive 
war should not be transformed into one of conquest. Its conclu­
sion must see the peaceful federation of Europe and the world 
and the revival of the International. 1
1. Carl Brand, ’’British Labor and the International During the Great 
War, ’’ Journal of Modem History, VIII (March, 1936), 43-44*
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Shortly before the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference met, Jov/ett 
asked his first question in the House of Commons. On February 11th 
he asked Grey if the Government was prepared to state publicly "‘the
cuss terms of peace with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey'". The
Foreign Secretary replied in the negative. So, the next month the
National Council of the I.L.P. issued a manifesto demanding the same
thing. A copy of this manifesto was forwarded to the socialist partie
in all the belligerent countries imploring them to do likewise and to 
1
press their governments for a formal declaration.
The I.L.P. Annual Conference that year was held during Easter at 
Norwich. By a vote of 118 to 3 the delegates endorsed the anti-war 
attitude which the National Council had adopted since the start of the
war. It was also decided that the party should resume its propaganda
activities which had been curtailed. ihe most important outcome of
the conference, however, was the party's endorsement of its first peace
programme. This programme was identical with the four cardinal pointe
of the U.D.C. Only the wording was slightly different and the third 
2and fourth points had been reversed.
^>ince the hostile reception of its recruiting manifesto in
1. Brockway, Socialism over Sixty Years, p. 151.
2. Ibid., pp. 133-34? Carl Brand, "The Reaction of British Labor to 
the Policies of President Wilson during the World War," American
Hi st.or ical Aeview, XOCVIII (January, 1933), 270. See Appendix A for 
the four points of the I.L.P.'s first peaoe programme.
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September, the executive committee of the B.S.P. had been wary not to 
bring the anti-war and pro-war wings of the party together. The annual 
conference which had been scheduled for December was postponed when the 
executive suddenly announced on the 3rd of that month that "it was 
’impossible to select a central point to which it was certain that 
anything like a majority of the branches could send delegates’ !. 
Realising that the complete cancellation of the party’s annual confer­
ence would raise a storm of protest from the anti-war wing, the 
executive went on to say that it felt it advisable to hold six coinci­
dent conferences, one in each divisional area. If coincident confer­
ences were held, the opportunity for the anti-war factions to unite upoi 
a common programme and then dispose of the pro-war majority in the 
executive would be severely restricted.
The conferences were held in February, 1915, and clearly indicate*
the wisdom of the executive’s decision. If the anti-war sections of
the party had been allowed to come together, they probably would have 
been able to defeat the pro-war members and take control of the party 
machinery. Numerous resolutions were passed and defeated which 
reflected the growing discontent of the party’s members with the 
executive: a resolution expressing confidence in the executive committ 
was defeated'/B to 70J one in favour of party participation in recruitin, 
meetings failed by the vote of 76 to 62. "The most significant 
decision taken was the resounding defeat by ninety-six votes to forty-oi 
of a i^yndmanite resolution affirming that the ’triumph of Central
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European autocracies over the politically free peoples of Western 
Europe’ would be ’fatal to the growth of socialist opinion’ and post­
poning to ’the morrow of the war’ the ’glorious battle’ for socialism.” 
The defeat of this resolution, however, was somewhat balanced by the 
defeat of an alternative resolution put forward by the Central Hackney 
branch. It stated that not only the ruling classes of the Central 
Powers but ’’’the ruling classes of all the belligerent countries are 
the enemies of democracy The resolution went on to say that
the capitalist class was the real enemy of the people and that it had
to be defeated before theSocialist Commonwealth could be established.
With the defeat of this resolution, the position of the executive was
somewhat strengthened and no real challenge to its authority was offere
The decision to hold ccancident conferences had paid off; and, while
the conferences had shown a deep division of opinion within the B.S.P.,
the party did not split and the pro-war section retained its grip on 
1
the party machinery.
The Hyndmanite resolution which had been presented at the con­
ference stated clearly the heart of the pro-war position of that factio 
within the party. It was re-stated in even more explicit terms later 
that year by Hyndman himself in a book entitled The Ihture of Hemocrac^ 
In it he argued that Prussian militarism had oaused the war. Most 
socialists were not peace at any price men, and they were fully aware c
1. Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, pp. 91-92.
. .. - .. .... - , - ...ggj
the fact that capitalism was not the cause of all war. ’’Social 
Democracy” would emerge much stronger from the war. The ’’National 
Collectivism and Bureaucratic Administration” which Britain had been
forced to adopt would facilitate post-war development of 'Co-operative 
Democratic Socialism” in the countiy. Indeed, after the war there 
could be no going back on the system of state collectivism created to 
meet the demands of the conflict. The war had brought powerful new 
currents which were guiding civilization in the direction of ”Co-ordina 
tion and Social Democracy”.
In the spring of 1915, the scandal over the shells shortage and 
the failure of the Dardanelles campaign combined to precipitate a
cabinet crisis in the Liberal Government which resulted in the forraatic
of the first Coalition Government. On May 17th Lloyd George and Bonai 
Law approached Asquith and asked that he form a coalition. Two days 
later, the Prime Minister through Henderson extended an invitation to 
the Labour Party to join with the Liberals and Conservatives in forming 
such a government.
The N.E.C. was confronted with a difficult decision. It was
mindful of the fate of small third parties which entered into coalitioi 
Purthermore, the Constitution of the party forbade it joining in any 
"capitalist” government. The crisis which the country was now facing
1. H.M. Hyndman, The Future of Democracy (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, Ltd., 1915), PP* 22, 25, 26, 103, 114, 203, 220.
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however, had not been foreseen at the time the constitution had been 
drawn up, and so, by a vote of nine to three, the N.E.C. decided to 
accept the offer. But the P.L.P. shortly after the executive decision 
had been made voted against accepting the Prime Minister’s offer, by 
the narrow margin of nine to eight. It was the M.P.s of the I.L.P. who 
were so violently opposed to joining in a coalition, and for once 
Clynes joined with his former colleagues to denounce the step Labour was
about to take.
Philip Snowden in his Autobiography twenty years later discussed 
t e attitude which those who were opposed to the coalition adopted when, 
after the P.L.P. vote, a joint session of the two bodies was held, the 
voting on this occasion being seventeen to eleven in favour of joining
uuch a step as joining in a Coalition Government was so opposed 
to the constitution of the Labour Party that it was felt a 
decision ought not to be taken without the sartion of a Party 
Conference. It was not within the powers of the Executive of 
the Parliamentary Party to take such a step, and even the 
exceptional circumstances at the time did not warrant it.
Despite the fact that the mjaority of the P.L.P. had been against the 
proposal,. the action wa3 taken anyway. Three Labour members joined
the Government: Henderson became President of the Board of Education
with a place in the Cabinet; William Brace became Under-Secretary for 
Home Affairs; G.H. Roberts became a Junior Lord of the Treasury.1
1. Carl Brand, ’’British Labor and the War-Time Coalitions,” American 
Historical Review, XXXV (April, 1930), 524-526; A.J.P. Taylor, Englit 
History, 1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 30-31 
Philip /.....
The early days of the Coalition were not smooth ones, and as 
early as June 5th Beatrice Webb wrote in her diary that ”... the 
Coalition Government is threatening to break the Labour Party into 
warring sections.” The I.L.P. and the B.S.P. were extremely critical 
of the party’s action. They argued that the war in no way cancelled 
capitalism. Jowett, according to his biographer, ’’was scathing in his 
comment” on the formation of the new Government. Still, the majority 
of the party approved the action. The Coalition was seen as the 
logical outcome of the party’s previous co-operation with the Governmen’ 
in the conduct of the war. The I.L.P. and the B.S.P. might be highly 
critical of the party’s action, but the bulk of Labour certainly 
approved.1
During the spring of 1915» the U.D.C. issued a pamphlet which 
argued in favour of a definite statement of war aims. Why »*e Should,
State Terms of Settlement declared that such an act would be an
advantage to the Allied powers and a disadvantage to the enemy. 
Furthermore, such a pronouncement would help prepare the way for a 
successful post-war settlement. If the Allies’ terms for peace were 
known, then the military leaders of the enemy would be deprived of the! 
greatest ’’moral asset” and would no longer be able "to encourage
... Philip Snowden, An Autobiography, Vol. I (London: Ivor Nicholson 
and bat son, 1934), p. 389; Robert McKenzie, British 23Litical Part ies 
2nd, revised, edition (London: Heinemann Education Books, Ltd., 
1967), PP. 400-01.
1. Brand, "British Labor and War-Time Coalitions,” AHR» XXXV, 525-26; 
Brockway, Socialism over Sixty Years, p. 199-
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resistance by representing those terns as so disastrous to Germany 
that sacrifice, however colossal, and reshtance, however prolonged, 
would be preferable to their acceptance." The pamphlet went on to 
assert that if the war was not ended by a negotiated peace, then 
Belgium would "be condemned to greater devastation and suffering than 
that which she has already endured". finally, it was necessary for 
the public to have time to form its own judgement on the policy to 
which it would be committing itself by the terms of the peace. The 
U.D.C. was not asking for a detailed statement of the exact nature of 
the settlement which the Allies sought, but, rather, it was asking for
a general statement which
would make it more difficult for our enemy’s Government to 
continue the war whentheir own peoples became weary; would 
give confidence to our own count zy to face the privations of 
a long war, if that should be necessary; would enable our 
people to decide with some capacity for judgment as to the 
policy of the settlement when the war shall end.
There was no response by the Government to the Union’s request for a 
statement of war aims. So, toward the end of 1915, the U.D.C. widened
the scope of its work and altered its objectives "so as to cover the 
forming of *such a policy as shall lead to the establishment and main­
tenance of an enduring peace’ and the organizing of support for such a 
policy".1
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The tremendous influence which the U.D.C. had on the development 
of Labour’s foreign policy both during the war and after it is reflect­
ed in the number of its leaders who were either members of the Labour
Party or would join the party later on. Of the eleven on the 
Pxec-itive Committee of the Union in 1919, five - MacDonald, Jowett, 
Snowden, Bramley and Swanwich - were already members of the Labour 
Party. The others - C.B. Buxton, C.P. Trevelyan, Morel, Ponsonby, 
Seymour Cocks, Pethick Lawrence - were to join the party shortly after 
the war. All of the members of the General Council that year were 
members or were to become members of the Labour Party. Among them 
were W.C. Anderson, Norman Angell, H.N. Brailsford, Bertrand Bussell, 
Philip Snowden and Ben Turner.”^
Prom the very beginning of the war, the anti-war socialists had 
been asking the International Socialist Bureau (i.S.B.) to call an 
all-inclusive conference of the International to discuss the possibi­
lities of an early peace. When the Bureau refused to do so, the 
Italian and the Swiss Socialist parties proposed a conference at Berne 
and issued an invitation to the anti-war socialists in every country to 
attend. When they met in Berne, it was decided that the conference 
should be moved to the little Swiss village of Zimmerwald to avoid 
publicity.
1. Swanwich, Builders of Peace, pp. 52-53? Catherine Ann Cline also 
lists a number of Liberals who shifted their allegiance to Labour 
after the wars op. cit., p. 34? fn. 26.
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The Zimmerwald Conference met on the 5th September. It was 
the first meeting of socialists from all of the belligerent countries 
since the war had begun. Both the I.L.P. and the B.S.P. had wanted to 
send delegates to it, but the Government had refused to issue them 
passports. The conference was a meeting of pacifist, not revolutionary 
socialists, and it confined itself largely to passing resolutions which 
called ’’upon the workers and Socialists of all countries to take 
immediate action for ’the termination of a war which dishonours humanity 
A maniifeto was also drawn up by the delegates which contained a peace 
formula denouncing annexation and indemnities, and demanding the right 
of nations to dispose of themselves as they saw fit. finally, a 
commission was established with headquarters in Berne to act as a kind 
of ’’ginger group” for the purpose of promoting a world-wide peace 
campaign. According to Postgate, the Zimmerwald Conference in the fall 
of 1915 was perhaps the most important and influential socialist con­
ference held during the war.
While the I.L.P. was not able to attend the conference, neverthe­
less a copy of the Zimmerwald Manifesto eventually managed to reach it. 
The party, however, disapproved of the manifesto’s condemnation of 
other Socialist groups, who were supporting the war in their own 
countries, and therefore gave it only qualified support. At the same 
time, the I.L.P. reaffirmed its belief that the I.S.B., even though 
negligent in its duty in the past, was still the proper authority to 
convene an International congress. Despite its criticism of the
—conference and its manifesto, the party declared that it would like 
to be represented at the further conference that was being planned, if 
it could obtain passports.
The B.S.P. executive on the other hand did not give even qualified
endorsement of the manifesto. "Instead it welcomed the conference as
’indicating the growing willingness of socialists in all countries to 
renew international relations’ and hoped that the Zimmerwald Conference 
would speedily be followed by action on the part of the I.S.B.” Thus 
the executive reaffirmed the party’s allegiance to the I.S.B. It did, 
however, appoint a corresponding Secretary, Tom Quelch, to keep in touch 
with the International Socialist Committee in Zimmerwald. The Hyndmani 
wing of the party protested against this action, but to no avail, and 
the split between the wings of the B.S.P. widened.1
At the same time that the Zimmerwald Conference was meeting, the
T.U.C. was holding its annual conference at Bristol. Since the 
conference scheduled for August 13th, 1914, had been postponed, thi# was 
the first time the trade unions had met since the beginning of the war. 
The conference was convened on the 6th, and of it Beatrice Webb wrote 
rather despairingly: "There is no anti-Govemment feeling, no determi­
nation to get evils righted." In fact, the Conference displayed
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something of the T.U.C.*s pro-Government feeling when it passed a
resolution endorsing the Labour Party’s action in May joining the
Coalition. While the conference approved of this action by the party,
nevertheless it passed another resolution which not only condemned
conscription, but also protested “’against the sinister efforts of a
section of the reactionary press*'’ in trying to impose it upon the
country. Anti-conscription fervour was high despite the resolution
approving the Coalition, and it was decided at the last moment to invite
Lloyd George on the pretext of explaining his munitions programme to 
1
come and try to neutralise it.
The question of compulsory military service was nearly responsible 
for Labour’s withdrawal from the Asquith Coalition in January 1916.
After the T.U.C. Conference in September, an attempt was made by both
the Government and Labour to revive the declining enlistment of men into
the armed services. Labour launched a recruiting campaign of its own,
and the Government came out with the “Derby Scheme”. Both attempts
failed, however, and early in January Asquith introduced the first
Military Service Bill designed to impose conscription on all unmarried 
2men between the ages of eighteen and forty-one.
On January 6th, the day after the Bill was introduced in the Commo
1. M. Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb’s Diaries» p. 435 McKenzie, British 
Political Parties, p. 401 $ Orton, Labour in Transition, p. 77•
2. G.D.H. Cole, A. History of the Labour Party from 1914* P* 26; Prank 
Owen, Tempestuous Journeyt Lloyd George, his Life and Times (London* 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), pp* 300-301.
Labour held a National Conference to discuss conscription. A resolutioi 
instructing the P.L.P. to oppose the Bill in all its stages was moved 
and passed by a vote ofl,998,OOJ to 7&3>000. At the N.E.C. meeting 
shortly afterwards, it wa3 decided by a vote of 16 to 11 that Henderson, 
Roberts and Brace should resign from the Government.1 The Labour Tarty 
was still very much pro-war, but it was afraid that compulsory militaiy 
service would be the first step toward compulsory industrial service, 
and the trade unions felt that they had already sacrificed enough.
Labour was so adamant in its opposition to conscription that it was even 
willing to withdraw from the Coalition to prevent it.
when Henderson, Roberts and Brace met on the 7th to draw up their 
letter of resignation, Asquith persuaded Henderson to hold it in abeyanc 
until he had talked to a joint meeting of the N.E.C. and the P.L*P.
That meeting was held on the 12th, and at it the Prime Minister con­
vinced the majority of the party’s leaders that the Bill was not meant 
a3 a wedge for industrial conscription. He even promised amendments to
it. The party therefore agreed to remain in the Coalition until the
2annual conference had met later that month and voted on the issue. '
The Annual Conference of the Labour Party met in Bristol on 
January 26th, 1916, and was the first party conference to be held since 
the beginning of the war. While the party’s entry in the Coalition wai 1 2
1. Brand, ’’British Labor and War-Time Coalitions,” AHR, XXXV, 527? 
Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, p. 109.
2. Brand, op. cit., p. 528.
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was endorsed by 1,622,000 votes to 495,000, it was the recent passage 
of the ^.xilitary Service Bill which was the central topic of debate.
The conference declared by a vote of 1,716,000 to 360,000 its opposition 
to the Bill, and a motion which would have pledged the party to agitate 
for it3 repeal was just lost by a vote of 649,000 to 614,000.
Another issue discussed by the party was the P.L.P.’s support 
for the Government’s recruiting campaign. In the debate which preceded 
the vote on that issue, Snowden spoke on behalf of the I.L.P. defending 
their reasons for having opposed it. The resolution approving the 
P.L.P.’s action, however, was endorsed by an overwhelming majority - 
1,847,010 to 206,000. Finally, a resolution which expressed the party’ 
opposition ”’to all systems of permanent militarism as a danger to humar 
progress’", justified the Government’s present action in the war, e g ress 
ed the party’s horror at the atrocities committed by Germany, and pledge
’’•the Conference to assist the Government as far as possible in the 
successful prosecution of the War”*, was moved by James Sexton of the 
Bookers Labourers. The pros and cons of the resolution were ardently 
debated, but in the end it was passed by a vote of 1,502,000 for and 
602,000 against.^
Bespite the fact that the B.S.P. executive’s attitude toward
1. Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, pp. 110-111, Snowden, An Auto­
biography, I, pp. 394-95$ Stansky, The Left and War, pp, lSo-171.
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Zimmerwald had exacerbated the conflict between the two wings in the 
party, nevertheless the party managed to hold together for a while 
longer. The annual conference of the B.3.P. at Salford in April 1916, 
however, saw the rupture completed. The climax to the long and bitter 
struggle between the pro-war and anti-war factions came when a resolu­
tion to close the conference to the press and simply issue statements 
to it at the end of each session was moved and passed. It was thought 
by the anti-war group that such a move would ensure freedom of discussii
at the conference and also protect the delegates from later prosecution 
or victimisation. Hyndman and his supporters were strongly opposed 
to the resolution, and when they failed to defeat it, walked out. . 
Twenty-two delegates left with Hyndman, but a few returned later merely 
to observe its proceedings.
The majority of those who remained at the conference were in 
favour of peace by negotiation and an immediate end to hostilities, and 
they passed a resolution to this effect. It went on to assert that 
total victory by either side or the exhaustion of both would lead to a 
peace that would only be temporary and would contain the seeds of futur 
wars. Permanent peace could only come with the overthrow of capitalis: 
but the only hope for a satisfactay end to the present war lay '“in the 
united demand of the international working class for the immediate 
conclusion of a peace which will secure complete freedom and autonomy 
for all nations, free all occupied territory from the invader, and 
permit no annexations against the wishes of the peoples concerned’".
_______ ______ ________
—--- - --------------------------------------
The conference therefore ’’instructed ’the Executive Committee of the 
Party to work for the immediate reestablishment of the International 
as a necessary preliminary to a united Socialist campaign in favour of 
peace”’. The B.S.P. furthermore called on the Government to make a 
clear and definite statement on the objects which the Allies were 
fighting for. Finally, resolutions endorsing the Zimmerwald manifesto, 
denouncing the Labour Party’s entrance into the Coalition, and ex; Lling 
several of the party’s militantly pro-war members, were passed.'
Upon leaving the B.S.P., the Byndmanites formed the National 
Socialist Advisoiy Committee, and on the 3rd of June, 1916, this 
committee adopted the name National Socialist Party (N.S.P.). 'The 
N.S.P. was the only militantly pro-war section of British socialism 
during the war. The party pledged itself to support the Allied cause 
until the Central Powers had been completely defeated. A manifesto to 
the dominions was issued in September 1916, explaining why the party hac' 
been formed, and the next year in June the N.S.P. turned down an invita­
tion to Stockholm and began to work actively against the proposed
conference.
The Military Service Bill in January 1916 did not achieve its
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anticipated results. On the contrary? A.J.P. Taylor says that it 
actually kept more men out of the service than it drew in. "Instead 
of unearthing 65O?OOO slackers, compulsion produced 743,537 new claims 
to exemption, most of them valid, on top of the million and a half 
already ’starred’ by the ministry of munitions.” Agitation for 
another bill began in the spring, and on May 3rd the Military Service
Bill was introduced in the House of Commons. The new Bill was meant *
extend conscription to married men despite the Government’s earlier 
pledges not to do so. Labour did not oppose it as it had the previous 
one, probably because the party was now convinced of the necessity for 
compulsory militazy service. MacDonald led the small group of 
Labourites who opposed the measure, and on the 24th of May he made a 
vigorous speech against its enactment. At the same time he redefined 
his views on the war and the peace to be made at its conclusion. dhe 
next day the Bill was passed in the Commons.
The summer of 1916 was fairly quiet as far as Labour was concerns 
Probably the only incident of any significance as far as the developmen 
of party foreign policy was concerned was the meeting of the Allied 
Economic Conference at Paris, June 14th to 17th. The conference 
decided in favour of extending economic advantages to the Allied
1. Taylor, English History, p. 55? H. Hessel Tiltman, J. Ham say, ,ac- 
Donald* Labor’s Man of Destiny <New Yorks Frederick A. btokes Com­
pany, 1929), p. 128.
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countries as deemed necessary. These advantages were even to be
carried over into the post-war period. To Labour, especially the 
anti-war section of the party, it appeared the Allies were about to 
embark on a course of economic warfare which would be aimed partic larlj 
at the Central Powers at the end of the war. The U.D.C. was so opposec 
to the proposal adopted at Paris that it produced a fifth cardinal 
point which stated that ”’the European conflict shall not be continued 
after the military operations have ceased.,H British policy should be 
directed *”towards promoting free commercial intercourse between all 
nations, and the preservation and extension of the principle of the 
open door’”.}'
After the war the continuation of economic warfare would become
one of Labour’s chief grievances against the Peace Treaty. Even before 
the Treaty was signed Arthur Henderson wrote a little pamphlet entitled 
Labours After War Economic Policy in which he deprecated the idea of 
Europe being divided by the peace into two hostile economic camps. The 
argument that such an event would lead inevitably to a conflict between 
the two hostile groups in the not too distant future was used by Labour 
during the post-war period to oppose proposals to cripple Germany 
financially.
Between September 4th and 9th the T.U.C. Annual Conference was
held at Birmingham. The strength of the pro-war section within the
1. Trevelyan, The Jnion of Democratic Control, p. 5*
trade union movement was demonstrated by its rejection of a proposal 
by the .unerican Federation of Labour. That ori'.'^nisation had suggested 
that an international trade union congress which would include unionists 
from all the belligerent countries be held at the same time as the peao< 
conference. The Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C. had brought 
forward a resolution backing the A.F.L. proposal, but the vote was 
1,486,000 to 723 ,000 against it and clearly indicated the pro-war 
attitude of the majority of the unionists against even meeting with the
German Social Democrats at the end of the war. Another resolution
calling for an end to conscription after the war was moved and passed
at the convention."
In May 1916 the I.3.B. had issued a manifesto to its members 
which stated the problems involved in cdling an all-inclusive inter­
national conference and asked the individual sections affiliated to the
International to state what they thought were the primary principles 
which should be embodied in the settlement. Vandervelde and Buysmans 
had come to Britain in April to request a statement from British Labour 
concerning the peace, and on their visit met separately with the 1. .P., 
the B.S.P., the Fabian Society, the P.L.P. and the N.E.C. They told 
the groups that the International was not strong enough to force the 
peace issue, but that it could mobilize opinion through its affiliates
- 47 -
1. Van der Slice, International Labor Diplomacy and Peace, p. 137; 
Brand, ’’British Labor and the International,” JMH, VIII, p. 48*
upon the terms of the treaty. They then urged each section of the 
Labour Party to study the problems involved and to draft reports for 
the Bureau. The Fabian Society, the I.L.P. and the B.S.P. responded 
to the I.S.B.’s request and set up committees to study the question and 
draw up a report for the Bureau. The N.E.C. and the P.L.P. on the 
other hand flatly refused to participate since the majority of the partj 
was against any premature statement of peace.
The Fabian report was drawn up and submitted to the I.S.B. in 
August, and the first thing which it suggested was the establishment of 
an international organisation based on the proposals made in the ^ocietj 
recently-published book, International Government. While the democratj 
control of foreign policy, the destruction of national armaments and 
Government control over such armaments, and ’’’the adoption of Universal 
Freedom of Trade, Freedom of Commercial Enterprise, (and) Freedom of 
the Seas’” were all dearable, still the only way that future wars might 
be prevented was through ’’’the deliberate establishment of some way of 
settling disputes among States, or conflicts among peoples, other than 
that of resorting to armed force’”. The report went on to propose 
opposition to the territorial mutilation of Germany at the end of the 
war; compulsory disarmament of Germany and Austria as a prelude to 
reduction of armaments by the Allies; national determination of
1. M. Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb’s diaries, pp. 56-57, Brand, ’’British 
Labor and the International,” JMH, VIII, p. 47•
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territorial changes except in the few cases ’’where ’the geographical 
and strategic requirements’ of other States” should be placed before 
national aspirations; the freedom of each country to determine its 
own economic policy; government preparation against a depression at 
the end of the war; and, finally, the appointment of an International 
Commission to render financial aid from an Indemnity Fund to those who
had suffered the most in the war.
Shortly after the Fabian committee submitted its report to the 
I.S.B., the I.L.P. committee submitted a report, too. The I.L.P.
still demanded that the I.S.B. should call a conference of all the
sections of the International. Such a conference should be held even
if certain sections refused to participate. Ihe conference which the 
I.L.P. was demanding should do only two things: take steps promoting 
an early peace, and declare the principles on which the peace settlemenl 
should be based. After this introductory comment, the report suggested 
the following principles which the party thought the International 
should try to have incorporated in the peace settlement:-
1. No annexation of territory invaded or seized by force 
of arms.
2. The restoration and indemnification of Belgium.
3. The questions of the boundaries and independence of 
Poland and the Balkan States, together with the readjustment
of other national boundaries, to be the subject of international 
adjudication with the assent of the people whose national 
affiliation it is proposed to change.
4- Dependencies in Africa and elsewhere to be dealt with 
by agreement—freedom of commerce in those dependencies to to 
equal for all nations. The economic and political freedom of 
the native peoples to be fully safeguarded.
/f • • • •
________________ __ _________
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With respect to the establishment of guarantees for
future peace we urgeJ-
1. All Treaties between nations to be public documents, 
submitted to and endorsed by the Parliaments of the contracting 
Parties. Secret Treaties to be invalid in International Ljbw.
2. An International Court and Council to be created to
administer international law.
3* The manufacture and supply of armaments by private 
companies to be abolished, with a view to the ultimate 
abolition of armaments in favour of International arbitration 
and law.
4» International Free Trade. The policy of the open 
door, together with International Labour Legislation upon such 
matters as the eight hours’ day, the age limit of child labour, 
and the abolition of sweated conditions.
5» The abolition of compulsory military service.
In closing the I.L.P. stated that the war had not weakened its faith in 
internationalism. On the contrary, it had strengthened it. " ’ iurope 
must get ridTof her autocratic rulers who plunge their people into war. 
socialism and Peace could only be achieved if the people would come 
together and "’unite to build a better future’".'1'
The Fabian Society did not stop with the issue of its proposals f< 
peace to the I.S*B. In November it printed in the New Statesma i 
"An Allied Peace: An unofficial forecast of the terras’’, which elaborar- 
ted on its earlier proposals for a successful peace settlement. It 
listed five points which it suggested could be used as a basis of 
discussion between the belligerent powers
1. McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, p. 144; Archi­
bald Fenner Brockway, Socialism for Pacifists (London: The 
National Labour Press, Ltd., 1916), pp. 52-55•
—- 51 -
(1) Successful Invasion should not in itself justify
Annexation.
(a) Restoration of independence of Belgium, oerbia 
and Montenegro* Full compensation to Belgium.
(b) Restoration of territories invaded by both sides 
subject to any readjustment under (2) (a).
This to involve the restoration to Germany of
her colonial territories or an equivalent.
(2) Reasonable satisfaction of:
(a) Demands for the application of the principle of 
nationality in Europe, by readjustment of 
frontiers, autonomy, or other solution.
(b) Demands of the Central Powers and other Euro­
pean States for increased economic opportunity 
in economically underdeveloped countries.
(3) widest possible application of the principle of the
Open Door.
(4) Acceptance by both sides of effective guarantees 
against war on land or sea by the establishment of a 
permanent system for the pacific settlement of inter­
national disputes. Such a system should involve 
limitation of armaments.
(5) Reference to a Conference of belligerents and neutrals, 
or to permanent Commissions, of the detailed working 
out of the above on the basis of the principles agreed 
to by the belligerents.
following these five points, the Committee which had drawn up the 
proposal issued a memorandum in which it elaborated them and discussed 
the kind of settlement which the Society thought might be able to achiev 
permanent peace. What the Fabians desired was "a settlement dictated 
by thought for the future, rather than by retribution for the past 
While they agreed with responsible British statesmen who had repudiated 
the intention of conquest, still their repudiation should not be taken
*
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to mean ’’mere revision to the status quo ante helium with all its
anomalies”. The principle of nationality should be satisfied as far 
as possible in Europe, but undoubtedly in some cases autonomy of a 
small state within a larger would prove more efficacious than 
independence. Suggestions that, ”Special economic opportunities might 
be ensured to German enterprise in Asiatic Turkey,” and ”The Armenian 
provinces might come under Russian Suzerainty,” smacked of the 
influence of H.N. BraBsford, a prolific U.B.C. writer, on the Society. 
In July the Union had published his pamphlet entitled Turkey and the 
Roads of the Bast which proposed exactly the same compromise which the 
Fabians were now putting forward.
The new Fabian proposal went on to suggest that the principle 
of the Open Boor “should be applied to all extra-European territories 
which are subject to the control of the belligerents”. Furthermore, 
the reduction of armaments, the Society said, would come about when 
evezy nation was willing to bind itself to submit all disputes to some 
kind of international court or council. The post-war problems of 
international organisation would concern the neutrals as well as the 
belligerents, and separate commissions perhaps should be established 
to deal with them. U.D.C. influence was also apparent when the 
committee ended the report by stating! ”It is desirable that the 
thought of the country should be exercised on the proposals of peace, 
however remote and uncertain peace may be.” This was exactly the 
same proposal that the Union had made in its pamphlet Why We Should
____________________________ ___________
State Terms of Settlement in the summer of 1915,*^
Toward the end of 1916, Lloyd George proposed to Aaquith that he 
reorganise the War Cabinet. The recommendation undoubtedly was a good 
one and might have been acted upon had not the minister of Munitions 
suggested that the Prime Minister should exclude himself from the new 
cabinet. Lloyd George had come to the conclusion that he could win 
the war himself if given a chance. A.J.P. Taylor has depicted the 
conflii which ensued: "On the one side, Lloyd George, man of the people 
supported by almost the entire nation; on the other, Asquith, supported 
by every Cabinet minister, and mighty, as he believed, in the force of 
the two party machines.”
Many backbench Unionists were longing to dispose of the Prime 
Minister, and when Sonar Law saw that he was losing his control over 
this section of his party, he sought to appease them. He threw his 
support to Lloyd George, and together they managed to dispose of As-quit) 
Actually, the Prime Minister resigned on December 5th thinking that 
neither Law nor Lloyd George could form a government on their own. 
According to Taylor: ’’Asquith was not manoeuvred out of office. He 
deliberately resigned office as a manoeuvre to rout his critics.” wh® 
Law was asked by the King to form a government, he said he would do so
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only if Asquith would join it. Asquith naturally refused. To his 
dismay, however, Lloyd George now accepted the king’s commission and 
after acquiring Labour’s support formed a new coalition government.
The events surrounding the actual formation of the Government 
are obscure. Carl Brand commenting on Labour’s part in it says that 
’’the developments took place so rapidly, that when the Labour executive 
Parliamentary party met in joint conference /on the 6thit was alrea< 
too late to express any preference for the retention of the late govern­
ment”. Perhaps Labour thought that Asquith would not be able to come 
back successfully to form a new government. Perhaps it thought that 
given a chance he might be able to do so, but that for its own part it 
had more to gain from lending its support to Lloyd George. Whatever 
Labour’s motives, the methods used to oust Asquith were distasteful to 
the majority of the party.
Lloyd George made his bid for Labour’s support on the 7th. on 
that day the N.fi.C. and the P.L.P. met with him at noon at the .var 
Office. After appealing to the representatives for their’ support, 
Lloyd George outlined the machinery that he had in mind for the new 
government. There should be a new War Cabinet of five in which 'lender 
son was to be Labour’s representative. The Board of Trade and the 
Ministry of Munitions were to be consolidated to form a Ministry of 
Labour, and a Labour man would be put in charge of it. A Ministry of 
Pensions would be established and Labour would be given the direction
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of it, too. Various other posts of a lesser nature would also be fill
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by members of their party.
After listening to his proposals for the new machinery of the 
government, the Labour apresentatives proceeded to cross-examine 
Lloyd George on a number of points. The first and the last questions 
which they asked him concerned the part Labour would be allowed to play 
at the peace negotiations. According to his own memoirs, Lloyd George 
reply to the first question was ’’that it seemed inconceivable that any 
Minister should make terms of Peace without consulting the representa­
tives of Labour.” His reply to the second was that he ’’thought peace 
was a long way off yet, but Jhe_y sincerely hoped that when the time 
came there would be a Labour representative at the conference". Thes« 
were the answers which Lloyd George recorded in his War Memoirs nearly 
twenty years later, but they were not taken from any official text of 
the meeting itself. After the war Labour would claim that he had 
definitely promised that the party should have direct representation a1 
the peace settlement. Perhaps Lloyd George did actually promise this, 
Perhaps Labour forfeited its claim to his promise when it withdrew froi 
the Coalition before the peace talks ever began. The fact remains, 
however, that the party did not have direct representation at the 
peace conference.
Numerous other questions were put to Lloyd George. The questio; 
of industrial conscription was raised, and he replied that a scheme fo 
the recruiting of new volunteers for the most vital industries was 
being considered. If it failed, however, the complete mobilization
of labour might have to follow. As for the continuation of military 
conscription after the war, he said that it most definitely would be 
discontinued ”if we win the War. If wejdid not, we should have to get 
conscription in order to defend our homes.” Lloyd George denied that 
there was any plan to introduce black labour in Britain, but acknow­
ledged the fact that there was ’’black labour in battalions for stance, 
because we could not get enough men behind the lines in order to save 
men in this country.” On being asked if the Government would insist 
on a ’’decisive victory” or would be willing to listen to peace proposali 
from either neutrals or the enemy, he said that it would listen providec 
the proposals were reasonable. First, however, the Government must 
have a clear idea of just what was being proposed.
The delegation then retired to the House of Commons to consider 
the situation. The vote was 1? to 12 in favour of joining the Govern­
ment. Carl Brand has written that in one respect Labour established 
its independence by going into the Coalition. Before the formation of 
the Lloyd George Coalition, Labour had been forced to act ”something 
like a left wing of Liberalism” because of its numerically weak po3itioi 
In the new Coalition, however, ”it was associated with the Lloyd George 
group and the Unionists, while the official Liberals were in opposition 
Thenceforth, Labour pursued a more independent career.”
1. Taylor, English History, pp. 66—7^; Owen, Tempestuous Journey, pp. 
348-349; Brand, “British Labor and 'War-Time Coalitions,” AHR, XXXV, 
531-32; David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol. Ill (London: Ivor 
Nicholson & Watson, 1934), PP« 1058-61.
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On Decaaber 18th, 1916, President Wilson in the United States 
called on the belligerent s to state unequivocally their peace terms 
so that the world might know and be able to compare them. Wilson’s 
proposal was criticised by the majority of the Labour Party. It was 
his assertion that the professed war aims of the belligerents were 
basically the same which was most irritating to the party. aVen the 
Fabian Society was inclined to criticise the President’s proposal.
The I.L.P. on the other hand saw it as an opportunity for the Allies tc 
state their case to the neutral world, and Snowden and MacDonald both 
praised the action taken by Wilson.
The next month Wilson presented his "peace without victory” 
speech to the Senate. Thi3 was on the 22nd, the day "before the annual 
conference of the Labour Party met. When the conference convened, 
Labour warmly greeted this latest proposal by the President. The 
majority of the party along with the U.D.C., I.L.P. and B.S.P. enthusi­
astically supported his latest proposition. Only the extreme right­
wing criticised it.^
After showing its enthusiasm for Wilson’s latest proposals, the 
conference settled down to business. The question of the party’s 
having joined in the formation of a second Coalition was debated 
ardently. S.C. Fairchild (B.S.P.) and Philip Snowden (I.L.P.) spoke
1. Brand, ’’British Labor and President Wilson,” ASH, XXXVIII, 272-73
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out against the action. J.B. Thomas and J.B. Clynes were among those 
who spoke in favour of it. The final vote on the resolution showed 
a large majority in favour of the party’s action in joining - 1,849»COC 
to 3^7,CCO - which was even more decisive than the vote the previous 
year at Bristol on the Asquith Coalition. Another resolution was 
passed at the conference which deal£ with the continuation of the 
war. It stated that the fight should continue until an Allied victory 
had been achieved. When the peace conference was convened, the Allied
socialists and trade unionists should meet at the same time. This was
in keeping with the T.U.C.’s refusal in September to endorse the A.P.L.’ 
request for an international trade union congress which would include 
representatives of the enemy countries, to meet at the same time as the 
peace conference. The unionists were willing to meet with the Allies 
but not the enemy socialists and unionists.
A third resolution stated the party’3 desire to be adequately 
represented in the British delegation to the peace conference. It alsc 
declared that Labour’s representatives at the conference should work
for:
(i) The formation of an International League to enforce
the Maintenance of Peace on the plan advocated by the President 
of the United States and approved by the British Foreign 
Secretary; each affiliated nation to cooperate to restrain 
by any means that may be necessary any Government or Nation 
which acts in violation of the Laws and Judgements of the 
International Court;
(ii) The adoption by all States of legislation to ensure 
the maintenance of proper labour conditions on standards approved 
by the accredited Trade Unions of the respective countries.
— ---------------------------------------------
According to Austin Van der Slice, "This was the first attempt on the 
part of the British Labour Party since the February 1915 Inter-Allied 
Conference to attempt the definition of peace terms of any kind," and 
it was endorsed unanimously. A further resolution criticised the 
proposals made at the Paris Economic Conference the previous summer, 
and declared that the Labour Party was opposed to any post-war economic 
struggle. The I.L.P. proposed a resolution which called for a con­
ference to discuss peace terms and reconstruct the International, but 
it WH3 defeated by a vote of 1,498,000 to 69$«0OO. Thus, the majority 
once again declared its faith in the righteousness of the Allied cau»e
and its distrust of enemy socialists and unionists. Another resolutic
which demanded that the Government state its willingness to enter into 
immediate peace negotiations was likewise defeated 3
Shortly after the conference, the Ib:ench Socialists, alarmed by 
the activity of the "Zimmerwaldians'1, proposed an Inter-Allied Conferer 
for March 10th in Paris. Labour initially agreed, but a few day3 
before the conference was to be convened, the party reversed its deci­
sion. On the 15th March the first Russian Revolution occurred and thi
initiated British Labour’s change in attitude toward that country and
2the conduct of the war. 1 2
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CHAPTER III
PRO-WAR AND ANTI-WAR POLICY AND SENTIMENTi
FROM THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION TO THE ’’KHAKI” ELECTION
The initial effect of the first Russian revolution on the Labour Party 
was a general increase in the party’s enthusiasm for the prosecution 
of the war. In the past Labour had found it difficult to reconcile th< 
democratic ideals which Britain was supposedly fighting for with the 
despotic Ally she was fighting beside. Now, with the abdication of 
the Czar and the establishment of the Provisional Government in Russia,
this conflict of ideals was resolved.
Shortly after the revolution, Bonar Law in the House of Commons 
moved the Government’s statement of congratulations. It congratulated 
the Russian people ’’’upon the establishment among them of free institu­
tions’” and expressed confidence that this would '’’lead not only to the 
rapid and happy progress of the Russian nation but to the prosecution 
with renewed steadfastness and vigour of the war . . . ’” To the 
pro-war section of the P.L.P., the resolution was acceptable and in fac 
expressed quite aptly their own sentiments on the revolution and the 
consequences they hoped it would have upon the conduct of the war.
When Law went on to express his own personal ”’feeling of compassion fo 
the late Tsar”’, however, which he believed he shared with the majority
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of the members of the Commons, Labour dissented. While the majority 
of the P.L.P. gladly endorsed the resolution, they did not feel any 
sympathy for the late Czar and criticised Law for his own expressions of 
remorse at the time he moved it 3
The Russian Revolution was not the only event which stimulated 
pro-war sentiment within the Labour Party in the spring of 1917• 
President Wilson’s address to Congress on April 2nd and the subsequent 
entry of America into the war on the side of the Allies four days later 
also reassured Labour of the righteousness of the cause for which the 
country was fighting. Labour journals ceased to criticise the United 
States for its commercialism and pro-Germanism and instead greeted the
prospect of American aid and closer ties between the two countries.
Lot all of the Labour movement was encouraged by America’s entuy 
into the war. The majority of the I.L.P. saw it as a blow to their 
hopes for a peace-by-negotiation. MacDonald, Snowden and Glasier all 
criticised the President’s action and predicted that the noble ideals he 
had espoused earlier would die as war fervour rose in the United States.
The Russian revolution not only increased pro-war sentiment in the 
Labour Party, but it also strengthened the activities of the anti-war
1. Stephen Richards Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolutioi 
1917-1924 (Cambridge, Mass.! Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 
18-19.
2. Brand, ’’British Labor and President Wilson,” AHR, XXXVIII, 274-75*
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groups both at home and abroad. On May 3rd, 1917, a committee of Dutch 
and Scandinavian socialists was formed for the purpose of promoting a 
conference to discuss the war aims of the belligerents. The proposed 
conference was to be held at Stockholm and would be open to minority as 
well as majority socialist groups from all countries.
On May 9th the Petrograd Soviet announced that it, too, desired a
conference at Stockholm to discuss war aims. The decisions of the
conference which the Soviet proposed, however, were to be binding on all 
participants. After a discussion between the Petrograd Soviet and the 
Dutch Scandinavian Committee, an agreement was reached to merge their 
plans. The N.E.C. of the Labour Party had earlier rejected the project 
of the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee because of the resolution passed in 
January at Manchester stating that the party should fight on ’’’until 
victory was achieved’”. Now that the Petrograd Soviet wa3 also proposi
a conference, the N.E.C. had to reconsider its earlier decision. .tuss
was an ally and her continued participation in the war was of the utmost
importance.
While the N.E.C. was tiying to decide just what course it should 
take, a new coalition government was formed in kussia in which the
socialists received six seats in the Ministiy instead of the one which 
they had previously held. Kerensky, formerly the only socialist in th< 
Provisional Government, became the leader of the new Coalition. Jhort] 
after it^as formed, the Government issued a declaration of policy repudj
ating any intention to make a separate peace, promising to democratise
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the army, and declaring itself in favour of a peace which excluded
annexations and indemnities and would allow nations to choose their own
destinies. The new government also endorsed the conference at Stockhol 
which the Petrograd Soviet was promoting, and its new foreign minister, 
hilinkov, telegraphed the British Government to ask that a Labour 
delegation be allowed to participate in it.
The N.E.C. was still reluctant to go against the Manchester 
resolution, but it saw a new urgency in the Stockholm proposal now that 
it had the backing of the Russian Government. Therefore, it decided tc 
send a delegation to Petrograd to find out more about the conference.
On ilay 20th three of its own members were chosen - G.H. Roberts, . Oaa 
ter, Ramsay MacDonald - representing the right, centre and left 
positions of the party. They were to go to Petrograd to discuss
Stockholm with the Soviet and then on to Moscow to establish contact
with the new Government.
On i-lay 11th the I.L.P. and the B.S.P. formed a committee - the 
United Socialist Council - to promote a convention at Leeds for the 
purpose of welcoming the Russian revolution. Before the convention wai 
held, the council received an invitation from the Petrograd Soviet to
1. Brand, ’’British Labor and the International,” JMH» VIII, 50-51; 
Postgate, The International during the War, p. 34; Snowden, An ^eto- 
biography, I, pp. 448-49; Keith Hutchison, The Decline and Pall of 
British Capitalism (Londons A.W. Bain & Co., Ltd., 1951), P» 152; 
Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, p. 123-
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send a delegation to Petrograd to discuss Stockholm. The I.L.P. and 
the B.S.P. each appointed their own delegates and the labour Party agree 
that the delegations should travel together.'1'
The Leeds Convention was widely publicised, and when the Labour 
Leader printed the four resolutions which were to be considered at it, 
the Government became concerned. On June 1st Milner, one of the five 
members of the War Cabinet, sent a letter to Lloyd George stating that 
something must be done about the revolutionaries in Britain, but that it 
was too late to prevent the United Socialist Council from holding the 
Leeds Convention and then sending its delegation on to Russia. enclose 
in the letter was a memorandum by Victor Fisher, Milner’s private 
secretary, strongly opposing the delegation’s going, and stating that 
the Labour Leader had shown that the forthcoming convention was designed
as a first step to revolution. The confidential memorandum was entitle* 
"Mission of I.L.P. and B.S.P. readers to Russia" and sought to persuade 
Lloyd George to rescind the Government’s earlier decision to allow the 
group to go. That decision had been made largely at the request of 
Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Russia. Rae memorandum said that 
Henderson was to blame for not advising the Government to parent the 
Leeds Convention and that the Labour Party should have expelled "the
I.L.P. and B.S.P. from its ranks in view of the revolt which this Conven­
tion /constituted^, by sections affiliated to the Party", and its failur
1. Snowden, An Autobiography, I, pp. 4fP-51*
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to do 30 was "an act of unpatriotic neglect and shameful inaction on 
the part of the labour Party Executive”. The memorandum concluded with 
the following' paragraph:-
To sum up, Mr. MacDonald and his colleagues will now go
to Russia not as the delegates of the small factions of the 
I.L.P. and B.S.P., but as the delegates of a frankly revolutionary 
gathering nominally representing many tens of thousands of British 
working men. They will in my judgement do unutterable miscnief 
while they are in Russia. They will return from Russia with an 
immense prestige in the eyes of their followers here, they will 
feed the Syndicalist Press in England directly or indirectly 
with articles purporting to express at first hand the views of 
our Russian '‘brothers*’ and they will form the nucleus of a 
dangerous revolutionary movement in this country.
The Leeds Conference met as scheduled on June 3rd. The four 
resolutions printed beforehand in the Labour Leader were moved and passe 
the first one hailed the Russian revolution; the second one welcomed 
’’’with the greatest satisfaction the declaration of foreign policy and 
the war aims of the Russian Provisional Government’” and stated the 
delegates’ belief that these would lead to a truly stable peace; the 
third called upon the British Government ”’to place itself in accord 
with the democracy of Russia by proclaiming its adherence to and determi 
nation to carry into immediate effect a charter of liberties . . . ’ 
the fourth called for the establishment ”’in every town, urban and rural 
district Councils of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates for initiating
1. Letter from Milner to Lloyd George dated June 1st, 1917, concerning 
the forthcoming Leeds Convention with an enclosed memorandum by Victo: 
Pisher - "Mission of I.L.P. and B.S.P. Leaders to Russia.” Lloyd 
George Papers, Beaverbrook Library, London, folder no. P/6/5/53*
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and co-ordinating working-class activity in support of the policy set oul 
the foregoing resolutions . . . ”* Oddly enough, the Stockholm Confer­
ence was not. mentioned in the resolutions.
The immediate msult of the Leeds Convention was an increased enthu­
siasm wifliin the anti-war groups, and on June 7th Beatrice ^ebb wrote in
her diary that she feared the conference was the beginning of a movement 
which would eliainate Labour as a political force after the war. An 
attempt to establish Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Councils was made, but it 
failed and the enthusiasm for the Leeds resolutions dissipated in the 
following weeks. Also, the joint Labour delegation which was to have 
travelled to Russia was stopped at Aberdeen when the Sailors’ and Fire­
men’s Union under the instruction of its leader, Havelock uilson, refuse< 
to take them to Petrograd. Stephen Graubard aptly summarised the resuli 
of the convention: ’’The Leeds Convention was a well-staged demonstratioi 
and as such left no permanent mark on the Labour movement.” ~
On *<iay 28th the »»ar Cabinet had decided to send Henderson to Kussii 
to try to revive waning relations between that country and Great Britain 
Sir George Buchanan was the Ambassador to Russia. According to Lloyd 
George, ’’the very fact that he had established excellent relations with 
the Imperial Government, and with the Provisional Government which
1. Snowden, Autobiography, I, pp. 453-55? Cole (ed.), Beatrice 
Webb’s Diaries, p.88; Graubard, British Labour and the Russian 
Revolution, p. 40.
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replaced it, made him an object of suspicion and distrust to the new 
Administration which had now been set up under Kerensky, with the 
support of the Soviet.” The Foreign Office had been urging the Govern­
ment to supplement or replace him with ’’someone whose known sympathies 
with Labour and Socialist movements would ensure him the confidence of
the Russian Government”. Henderson, therefore, was asked to go to 
Petrograd and after a few weeks send Buchanan back to London"for purpose 
of consultation”. According to Lloyd George, he was told that he ’would 
only be a temporary replacement for the Ambassador.
When he left for Petrograd, Henderson was in agreement with the 
rest of the War Cabinet that the proposed Stockholm Conference should 
not take place. On his arrival, however, he was shown by Albert Thomas 
the French socialist representing his country in .Russia, a telegram froa 
Lloyd George to himself which stated that the Prime Minister was in fact 
in favour of the conference. Still, Henderson was opposed tc the idea, 
and soon he joined with Qmile Vandervelde and Thomas in trying to 
persuade the soviet to drop the project. When their attempt failed, 
however, he and his colleagues gave in to the Russians. Hamilton in
her biography of Henderson says that he was converted to Stockholm 
for the very reasons which made Lenin oppose it. (Lenin was one of thi 
few in the Betrograd Soviet opposed to it.) ”It came to seem to him
1. David Lloyd George, .«ar Memoirs, IV, pp. 1891-92.
------------------------------------ - ---------- —---
the sole means of holding Russian democracy together against the dis­
ruptive tactics of the Bolsheviks; the sole chance of keeping Russia 
in the war.”'5'
Henderson spent six weeks in Russia and while he was there develops 
a very high respect for Sir George Buchanan and the work he was doin,,.
He wrote to the War Cabinet advising them to retain the Ambassador in 
his present position. This, he thought, would be "’in the best 
intei’ests of the Alliance, and . . • fwould^/ give the greatest 3atisfac 
tion to the Russian Government.1” According to Lloyd George, he simply 
came to the conclusion ’’that he could not undertake to relieve /Buchanan 
• . • even temporarily.”
Whether Henderson was completely convinced of the competence of
the Ambassador, or whether he simply felt that he could not undertake 
the responsibilities of the position himself, he left Russia early in 
July and landed at Aberdeen late on the evening of July 23rd. He 
immediately caught a train to London, and on his arrival went to the 
headquarters of the Labour Party. The next day he called a meeting of 
the N.E.C. and persuaded a majority of its members to convoke a special 
conference to discuss Stockholm and recommend it to the delegates 
provided it was to be only a consultative conference. At the meeting
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the executive also agreed to call an inter-Allied socialist conference 
prior to Stockholm to allow the Allied socialists to come to a prelimi­
nary agreement on war aims first. Furthermore, it was decided that 
Hendersn should go to Paris with MacDonald, the treasurer of the party, 
and G.H. Wardle, the acting chairman of the P.L.P., to attend a meeting 
called by the French United Socialist Party. The meeting was to discus 
the possibility of calling a conference of the inter-Allied socialists. 
It would now be possible to discuss Stockholm with the French socialists 
and a Russian delegation which had arrived in Britain on the same day at
Henderson.
Jn the 26th Henderson attended a meeting of the War Cabinet.
This was the first time he had met with the Cabinet since his return.
The day before he had sent a telegram to Lloyd George in Paris to tell 
him of his action and his immediate plans. Now, he told the War Cabine 
just what he proposed to do. They had not changed in their attitude t< 
ward Stockholm and coldly disapproved of his new position on the issue 
and of his plan to go to Paris.
The next day Henderson left for Paris with MacDonald and ‘Wardle, 
and there they consulted with the French and the Russians. It was
decided that the Stockholm conference should be consultative instead of
mandatory, but that each national section present should declare defi­
nitely what action it intended to take when it returned home. It was
also decided that the Allied socialists would meet in London before
going to Stockholm. When the Labour delegation returned from Paris
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the N.S.C. endorsed the action it had taken and went ahead with it3 
plan to hold a special conference on August 10th3
The day before the conference was convened, the N.E.C. met and anc 
ther discussion on Stockholm took place. By a vote of nine to five it 
was again decided to advise the party to pass a resolution favouring 
participation. The next day at the special conference Henderson 
delivered the main address. He spoke for more than/hour attempting to 
put all the facts before the delegates. In his concluding remarks he 
said that the time had come to supplement the military weapon of the 
country with the political one in order to secure an honourable and 
democratic peace. Later that afternoon a vote on the issue was taken 
and attendance at Stockholm was approved by a large majority - 1,346,OC 
to 550,000.
•ahile the conference agreed by a resounding majority that Labour 
should be represented at Stockholm, it was not able to come to an agree* 
ment as to the natui'e of the delegation which was to attend it. The
N.E.C. recommended
That the Party delegation consist of 24 representatives, 
the Executive to appoint eight, the Parliamentary Committee of 
the Trades Union Congress to be invited to appoint eight, and 
the present Special Conference to appoint eight; this sectional 
representation to be equally reduced should circumstances 
necessitate.
1* Ibid., pp. 127-28, 136; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, IV, p. 1894; 
Brand, ’’Labor and the International,” JMH» VTII, 52-53-
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The Miners’ Federation of Great Britain then moved an addition
to the executive’s resolution stating that *”no further additions 
thereto shall be permitted from any affiliated body in this country.’” 
This latter condition was an attempt to prevent separate socialist 
representation at Stockholm and in fact infringed on the terms of the 
invitation to that conference. Therefore, it was decided that the 
present conference should adjourn until August 21st when the question 
cf the nature of the delegation would again be taken up.^
The day after the conference, Henderson resigned from the ..ar 
Cabirsb. The vote in favour of Stockholm had come as a great surprise
to the Government. Apparently, Henderson had earlier intimated to 
the Cabinet that he would speak against the project, but at the last 
minute changed his mind and decided to hold to thqposition he had taken 
since his return from Russia. In his >ar Memoirs Lloyd George depicts 
the impression he left on the Cabinet at its meeting on the 8th:­
.... Apart from him and myself, there were also present 
the other members of the War Cabinet - Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, 
Bonar Law, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Derby and Sir William 
Robertson. I am not speaking alone fi’om my own recollection 
. . . when I say that the impression we all had was that Mr. 
Henderson at this discussion recognised the impossibility of 
pressing the Stockholm Conference, and agreed with U3 that it 
must be abandoned. Indeed, he assured us that he expected the 
Labour Conference would turn it down ”by a fair majority”.
1. Hamilton, Arthur Henderson pp. 151-152? Brand, ’’Labor and 
the International,” JMH, VIII, 54J Standky (ed.), The Left and 
jVar, p. 216.
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Henderson denied that he had ever deviated from his intended course to 
support Stockholm, and Beatrice V.'ebb in her diary seems to confirm this.
The conflict between his positions as a member of the war Cabinet 
and secretary of the Labour Party had reached its climax. In his 
letter of resignation, however, he stated that he continued to share
the Government’s desire "’that the war should be carried to a successful
conclusion”’ and he hoped that he might assist the country toward this 
end in a non-Government capacity.
Henderson’s resignation was accepted, but not as graciously a3 he 
had thought it might be. Two days later on the 13th a heated debate 
occurred in the House of Commons between himself and Lloyd George. The
debate only served to cloud the issue at hand, namely Henderson’s 
veracity in dealing with the War Cabinet. Undoubtedly the Prime 
Minister’s arguments proved the more tenable to the vast majority in 
the Commons. According to Beatrice Webb writing in May 1918$ Henderson 
left the Government harbouring "a veritable hatred of Lloyd George . . • 
determined to create an Independent political party, capable of becoming 
H.M. Government - and he turned to Sidney to help him."1
The special conference of the Labour Party reconvened on August 
21st. By this time the Government’s decision not to issue passports
1. Lloyd George, ..ar Memoirs, IV, p. 19115 Hamilton, Arthur Henderson, 
p. 158; M. Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb’s Diaries, pp. 93-94 (also see 
n. 1, p. 94); Stansky (ed.), The Left and War, p. 217*
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to the delegates was known. It had actually been made at the bar 
Cabinet meeting on the 8th after the Attorney-General had informed its 
members ’’that it would be illegal for any British subject to engage in 
conference with enemy subjects except with the authority of the Crown/’ 
The decision had been withheld from the August 10th conference, however, 
in the hope that Labour would of it3 own volition reject Stockholm. 
(Henderson at first had wanted to publish the decision, but according 
to Lloyd George, ’’after consulting with his Labour colleagues he found 
that they v/ere unanimously opposed to this being done before the Labour 
Party conference ...” He then told the Prime Minister that he 
agreed with his colleagues’ decision on the matter.) How, in view of 
the recent disclosure by the Government the reconvened conference 
proceeded to discuss the whole issue once more. The final vote on
Stockholm this time was 1,234,030 to 1,231,000 in favour of it. The 
previous majority of more than one million was reduced to a mere 3,000. 
This extraordinary reversal was due primarily to the decision of the 
Miners’ Federation of Great Britain to vote against the project. The 
miners were still adamant in their opposition to separate socialist 
representation at Stockholm.
While the actual vote was interpreted by the public as a reversal 
of the previous party decision, the real issue involved was not the 
principle of the conference at all, but rather the condition upon whicl 
it was to be attended. When a resolution on the composition of the 
delegation incorporating the miners’ amendment was later offered, it wi
—--------------------------------------
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overwhelmingly endorsed by 2,124,000 to 175»OOO.^
On August 28th the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference met in 
London. According to Brand, ”It was foredoomed to failure, however, by 
a condition imposed by the former French ’majority’ that no resolution 
should be binding unless passed unanimously.” Bor the most part the 
delegates agreed on the basic war aims which were proposed, but it was 
impossible to reach unanimity on them. The executive of the Labour 
Party submitted a Memorandum on the Issues of the War, but it was re­
jected. By this time it was evident that another conference would have 
to be held by the Allied socialists before Stockholm could take place. 
’’The official recoi'd of the Conference £stated_7 that ’it could not be 
disguised that the outcome of the conference was wholly disappointing.”
I he month of Jecember 1917 marks the acknowledgement by Labour of 
major change in its attitude toward the war. In the spring the Russiai 
Government had come out in favour of a peace with no annexation and no
indemnities, and since then there had been a gradual shift in pro-war 
opinion within Labour circles toward this idea. Now, after the failure 
of Stockholm and Henderson’s humiliation, and the publication of the
Lansdowne letter in November and the revelation of the secret treaties
1. Lloyd George, war Memoirs, IV,pp. 1901-10; Brand “British Labor an< 
the International,” JMH, VIII, 55-56; Graubard, British Labour and 
the Russian. Revolution, pp • 33-34 •
2. Brand, ’’British Labor and the International,” JMH, VIII, 56-57, 
Snowden, An Autobiography, I, p. 479•
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by the Bolsheviks the same month, even the trade union movement was 
aixious to issue a declaration of war aims. By doing so Labour hoped 
to inform the rest of the countiy just what it thought the major issues 
of the war were and what the primary provisions of the peace should be. 
It was also hoped that such a statement by the party would encourage 
the Government to state its own position. A conference of the Labour 
Party and T.U.C. was proposed for the 28th of the month for the 
specific purpose of issuing a declaration on war aims.
Before it met, however, Henderson published a pamphlet entitled 
The Aims of Labour. Undoubtedly, he was one of the most respected 
persons in the Labour movement at this time, and if anyone was in a 
position to speak for Labour it was he. The pamphlet clearly depicts 
the synthesis which had taken place since the spring of Labour’s 
pro-war attitude with that of the position adopted by the U.D.C. from 
the beginning of the war.
Henderson began by stating that internationalism would undoubtedly 
grow stronger the longer the war continued. After the war a “People’s 
International" should be founded which would "give concrete and practica
expression to the spiritual aspirations, social ideals, and moral passio 
of Humanity". Such an organisation must be based on the spirit of 
democracy. The German people if they believed in democracy "must begin
to establish in their own country a constitutional system of democratic 
government". Until this was done "it /wouldJ be impossible to build a
completely successful and effectual People’s International"
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The pamphlet went on to state that the people of Britain and not 
the Government must make the peace. This of course was what the tf.D.C. 
was demanding. Henderson, however, saw ’’the ambitious schemes of 
aggressive German militarism” as being primarily responsible for the 
war, and they had to be defeated before peace could come. Next he 
criticised the concept of the balance of power and said that the 
proposed League of Nations was the only way to obtain peace and security 
in the future. He even went so far as to propose that the League be
backed by military as well as moral and economic forces.
The British people were not fighting for territorial conquest. bu1 
Henderson did say that there would ’’have to be certain restorations and 
restitutions”. The right of self-determination should be ensured by 
the peac > treaty, but territories which were ’’not capable of exercising 
their right of self determination . . . should be placed in the hands o. 
an international commission acting under the direction and control of 
the proposed League of Nations”. Labour also favoured a reduction in 
armaments as one means of destroying aggressive militarism.
Next, he dealt with Labour’s attitude toward the possibility of 
Allied post-war economic aggression. Labour did not seek the politica
and economic destruction of Germany. It was definitely opposed to the
Paris Resolutions in so far as they advocated commercial and economic 
boycotting to impede the economic recovery of any country after the war
Henderson ended the pamphlet with the now familiar demand of the
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U.D.C. ”to brin^ the Foreign Office more directly under the control of 
Parliament and to give the people’s representatives larger powers of 
criticism in regard to foreign policy”. Finally, in the present 
situation, more use should be made of the moral, political and diplo­
matic weapons of the country and less of the military ones.^
The Aims of Labour never received the attention which The memoran­
dum on War Aims issued later that month did. Nevertheless, from a 
historical point of view it is probably just as important. The new 
attitude of the Labour Party toward the war and its outcome is clearly 
defined in it. War weariness, the Russian revolution, disappointment 
over the Government’s failure to declare its war aims, all had contribut 
to this change. This is not to 3ay that Labour suddenly stopped 
supporting the war. But by December 1917 its attutude toward it had 
undergone a distinctive change. No longer was the pro-war section of 
the movement unequivocally in favour of a fight to the finish. The ide 
of peace-by-negotiation came more and more to be accepted in Labour 
circles. Oven more important, Labour began to assert its independence
the Coalition.
On Friday, December 28th, the Labour Party and the T.U.C. met at 
Central Hall, Westminster, to discuss the war aims for which they thougi 
Britain should be fighting. A Memorandum on War Aims was presented to
1. Arthur Henderson, The Aims of Labour (London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 
December 1917), PP- 11. 29-30, 36, 39, 44-45, 49-50, 63-64.
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the conference and the delegates discussed its merits and defects. It 
wa3 Usically the same one which had been presented first to the special 
conference on Stockholm on August 10th and then to the Inter-Allied 
Socialist Conference on August 28th. It had been drafted by a sub­
committee of the N.E.C. made up of Henderson, Wardle, Roberts, MacDonald; 
Jowett and ^ebb. Now, after amending the memorandum, the conference 
proceeded to accept it as the basis on which the Labour Party hoped the 
peace settlement would be made. Graubard has aptly summarised it:­
. . . The declaration called for the establishment of a League 
of Nations, an International High Court, and an International 
Legislature. Imperialist motives were denounced; it was proposed, 
that new nation-states be created in the Balkans, based on the 
’’independent sovereignty of the several nationalities,” and united 
in a customs union. Poland and Luxembourg were guaranteed the 
right to decide their own futures, as were the citizens of 
Alsace-Lorraine. Italia Irredentia was to be restored to Italy.
Jews were to be protected in their citizenship rights everywhere, 
and the creation of a free Jewish state in Palestine was promised.
The dependencies of Turkey and Germany were to be placed under an 
International Commission of the League of Nations, to be adminis­
tered by that body until they were ready for full independence. 
Constantinople was to be declared a free port, to be supervised 
by an International Commission which would regulate traffic through 
the Dardanelles.
The memorandum resembled numerous other declarations made by the 
U.D.C., I.L.P. and pacifist groups previously. As Graubard has pointed 
out, however, its ’’uniqueness . . . lay not in its content but in its 
support”. For the first time, the trade unions came out in support of
1. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution, pp. 46-48; 
/an der Slice, International Labor Diplomacy and Peace, p. 102.
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such aims. The Government could not afford to offend such a power­
fully organised body, and shortly after Labour made its declaration, 
Lloyd George responded by issuing on January 5th, 1913, a memorandum on 
British ..ar Aims. The Prime minister’s memorandum was largely Labour’s
declaration reconstructed.
The annual conference of the Labour Party in 1913 was held at 
Nottingham on January 23rd. At the conference an attack on the 
Coalition was made by the B.S.P. and other left-wing groups. Hendersor 
put forward his and the N.E.C.’s position on the matter. He personally 
was finished with coalitions and came out emphatically against Labour’s
ever entering into such a government again unless the party was in
control of it. The present Coalition, however, had to be maintained b< 
cause its collapse would mean a general election and that would interfej 
with the international movement for a people’s peace which was just 
beginning to show promise. To avoid embarrassment, therefore, the pari 
should not pass a new resolution supporting the Coalition, but simply 
carry "the previous question". A motion to that effect was then made, 
and the executive’s position endorsed by a vote of 1,885,000 to 722,000 
The conference also passed a resolution vzelcoming Wilson’s recently
declared "fourteen Points" and Lloyd George’s statement on behalf of
. 1 
the Government of Britain’s war aims.
1. Brand, "British Labor and War-Time Coalitions," AHH, XXXV, 535-36; 
"British Labor and President Wilson," AHH, XXXVTII, 278-79*
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On February 20th, another inter-Allied socialist conference met 
in London to discuss again Allied war aims. All of the Allied countries 
were represented except Russia and the United dtates. The conference 
had been convened by the N.E.C. and the T.U.C. instead of the British 
section of the I.S«B., and therefore was able to exclude certain bodies
affiliated to the International and include certain others which vzere noi 
Thus, the obstruction tactics of the two extremes were avoided.
The Memorandum on War Aims which had been adopted by the Labour 
Party in December was presented to the conference, and after a few 
changes and additions it became the statement of aims which the Allied 
socialists sent to the socialist parties in the Central Power countries.
The Inter-Allied labour and Socialist Memorandum on War Aims, in Grau­
bard’s words, ’’satisfied every requirement for peace without annexation, 
indemnity, or vindictiveness.” Unfortunately, it had little influence 
upon the war, possibly because it was the end of May before the German 
Social Democrats received a copy of it.1
On November 7th, 1917> the second Russian revolution had taken 
place, bringing to power the minority socialists, the Bolsheviks.
Lenin assumed control, withdrew Russia from the war, and shortly there­
after sued for peace with Germany. After the first negotiations at 
Brest-Litovsk broke down in February 1913, Germany launched a vigorous 
attack against Russia and soon she was forced to sue for peace again.
1. Brand, “British Labor and the International,” JMH, VIII, 53-9*
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On .larch 2nd, 1918, the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, often viewed by
historians as the most vindictive treaty in modern times, was signed. 
Russia officially withdrew from the war and ceded a hugh area of her 
western territory to Germany.
Reaction within the Labour Party to Russia’s withdrawal from the 
war was generally restrained. Very few within the movement even thougl 
to criticise it, and these for the most part were led by Hyndman.
While Russia’s withdrawal was not generally criticised by the 
party, there was 3ome criticism of the methods being used by the
bolsheviks in carrying out the revolution itself. Ytfilliam Stephen
Sanders, a former member of the N.S.C. and Secretary of the Pabian
Society, wrote in 1918 a pamphlet entitled The Tragedy of Russia in 
which he accused the Bolsheviks of being directly responsible for the 
ruin of that country. According to Penner Brockway, even some of the 
members of the i.L.P. "who were wedded to the idea of change through 
Parliamentary institutions” were critical of the Bolsheviks. While 
the majority of the party approved of their socialist aims, they dis­
approved of the means through which they were trying to achieve them. 
The B.S.P. was the only Labour group which endorsed the Bolsheviks’ 
methods as well as their aims.1
1. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution, pp. 53-57; 
William Stephen Sanders/ The Tragedy of Russia (London: W.H. Smith 
& Son, 1913), P« 3; Brockway, Socialism over Sixty Years, p. 158*
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In June a Labour conference was held for the purpose of discuss­
ing the party’s attitude toward the electoral truce which it had pledged 
itself to support early in the war. The conference met on the 26th and 
was the first to meet under the new party constitution adopted back in 
Eebruaiy. On the 21st of June the eight Labour ministers in the Govern 
ment had issued a manifesto protesting against the constant barra ;e of 
criticism they had recently been exposed to from the left, and they 
defended their own record in the Coalition. The N.S.C. wa3 in sympathy 
with the ministers, and it favoured the maintenance of the truce. But 
the movement within the party for independence had grown exceedingly 
strong during the spring.
At the conference Henderson surprised the delegates by telling
them that the truce had not in fact been in effect since the end of
December, lpl6. when the Lloyd George Coalition was formed, the other 
parties had desired to change the existing agreement in a way that was 
unacceptable to Labour. Since then it had simply rested on a mutual 
understanding between the parties. Henderson told the delegates that 
the N.E.C. was 3till in favour of the truce, but that it was important
to find out just where the rest of the party stood. He explained that 
the resolution about to be voted on would affect by-elections only, 
and that it in no way was connected with the withdrawal of Labour from
the Coalition. A heated debate followed his explanation. When the
vote was finally taken, the result was 1,7C4,COO to 951>OQO in favour o:
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suspension of the electoral truce.
The events at the close of the war occurred almost as rapidly as 
the ones which had opened it. 'ihe Austrian revolution occurred on 
November 1st, and five days later the German navy revolted at Kiel.
On November 7th a Republic was proclaimed in Bavaria, and two days latei 
the Kaiser abdicated and a German Republic was proclaimed with Ebert, 
the majority socialist, as its first Chancellor. The new Republic was 
formally proclaimed on the 11th, the day the Armistice was signed.
The question of Labour’s remaining in the Coalition inevitably 
arose. Should the party remain in it until after the actual peace 
treaty was signed, or should it officially proclaim its independence 
now* For the most part the P.L.P. favoured stayirgin until after the 
treaty had been signed. The majority of the N.B.C. on the other hand 
favoured severance of the party’s ties with the Government.
On November 14th a special conference was convened at Central 
Hall in London to decide the issue. J.R. Clynes, one of the eight 
Labour ministers in the Government, argued in favour of the party’s 
continued support of the Coalition. Labour was the only moderating 
influence in Britain, he said, and it was the party’s duty to use its 
influence to ’’restrain . . . the more vengeful elements when the Peace
terms came to be drafted.” He was convinced that ’’unless Briti
1. Brand, ’’British Labor and War-Time Coalitions,” AHR, XXXV, 538
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workers had official representation, ferocious terms would be made
that would jet the stage for another world war within the lifetime of
1
some of those present that day.” After he had finished, Bernard Shaw 
made a fiay speech in favour of independence. The final vote was 
overwhelmingly in favour of withdrawal - 2,117,000 to 810,000, a 
majority of 1,307,000.
Soon after the Armistice and Labour’s withdrawal from the Coalitic
The "Khaki" Election was held. In its election manifesto, the party
called for ’“a Peace of International Conciliation’’’. Labour declared
’’’absolutely againdb socret diplomacy and any form of economic war, and
2,demanded_/ as an essential part of the Peace Treaty an International
Labour Charter incorporated in the very structure of the league of free
Peoples.”' ..hile the number of Labour representatives in the Commons
increased as a result of the election from 42 to 59 (A.J.P. Taylor’s
computation), still the party suffered the loss of its most dynamic
leaders. Henderson, MacDonald, Snowden and Jowett were among its
casualties. The party’s opposition to the "vindictive” Treaty of
Versailles and the League of Nations which it established would come 
‘ 2
primarily from outside Parliament.
1. Clynes, Memoirs, I, pp. 273-74*
2. G.D.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914, p. 43? Bran* 
"British Labor and War-Time Coalitions," AHR, XXXV, 539-40; Hamilton 
Arthur Henderson, pp. 189-90.
CHAPTER IV
POST-WAR REACTION TO THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES,
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND THE GOVERNMENT»3 
POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA, 1919-1920
A. The League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles
During the war, the idea of a League of Nations caught the imagina­
tions of thousands of British subjects. Numerous societies were founder 
for the promotion of the idea - the Bxyce Group and the League of 
Nations Society being two of the better-known ones. A great many 
individuals took it upon themselves to write and speak on behalf of a 
League. Labour, too, became very involved in this movement to eatablis 
an international organisation at the end of the war to ensure peace.
This was particularly true after the party’s publication of its memoran­
dum on War Aims in December, 1917* From then until the actual establis 
ment of the League in 1919, Labour’s interest was such that at least one 
authority ha3 written that it ’’was easily the most important political 
force behind the drive for a league of nations'* in Great Britain.^- The
1. Henry R. ..inkier, ’‘The Development of the League of Nations Idea in 
Great Britain, 1914-1919,” Ihe Journal of Modem History, XX (June, 
1948), 107-108. .......... . ...... ...........
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development of the League of Nations idea both during and after the war 
undoubtedly played a major role in the formation of the party’s foreign 
policy.
In the autumn of 1914 the I.L.P. outlined in the Labour Leader a 
plan for the re-establishment of peace in ISurope. The plan called not 
only for the cessation of hostilities, but it also ’’looked toward a 
’United States of £2urope, ultimately of the world, in which national 
armies and navies are replaced, until absolute disarmament is possible, 
by an International Police Force.’” At its annual conference in 19*5 
at Norwich, the I.L.P. formally adopted the proposal, and during the 
next two years the Labour Leader and the Socialist Heview filled in man^ 
of the details omitted in the original plan3 Thus, the I.L.P. was the 
first organisation within the Labour Party, and perhaps the first or­
ganisation in the countiy, to advocate the establishment of an inter­
national organisation at the end of the war for the maintenance oi peac<
and the abolition of national armaments.
As noted earlier the Union of Democratic Control had a tremendous
influence on the formation of Labour’s foreign policy. Until the latte: 
part of 1917? the Union served primarily as a link between the radical 
Liberals, who were disillusioned with their leaders’ policies, and the
I.L.P., vzhich wa3 staunchly opposed to the war. The ideas which it 
propounded, however, gradually came to permeate the Labour Party itself
1. Ibid.
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and among them was the idea of a League of Nations. Numerous members 
of the U.D.C. were strong advocates of the League, and they wrote and 
spoke prolifically on its behalf. Norman Angell, H.N. Brailsford and
J.A. Hobson were three of the more prominent ones.
While many of the members of the U.D.C. were among the most
outspoken advocates of the League, the actual support given to the idea
by the Union itself is sometimes overstated. A.J.P. Taylor in The
Trouble Makers points out that in the peace terms which the Union put
forward in July 1917, out of the thirteen points in the programme ’’the
League got one half-sentence". The two primary ideas which the U.D.C.
sought to promote during the war were open diplomacy and parliamentary
control of foreign policy. If these two objectives could be achieved,
then t.ioy would for i a strong foundation upon which a world league ..iglr
be established. Without them, hdwever, any international organisation
would be foredoomed to repeat the mistakes made in international rela- 
1
tions in the past.
The Fabian Society also played an important part in the develop­
ment of the League of Nations idea. Leonard S. Woolf was the chief 
spokesman for the Society on international affairs during the war, and 
1916 he produced in conjunction with several members of the Fabian 
Research Department one of the major treatises written in Britain on
1. Taylor, rhe Trouble Makers, p. 129; Winkler, "The Development of 
the League of Nations Idea," JIvIH, XX, 99*
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the League - International Government. (it is interesting to note 
that Woolf was also a member of the U.D.C., as were J.A. Hobson and
G. Lowes Dickinson, two of the members of the research department who 
helped him with it.) The work was more than just a study of the League 
of Nations idea. It also attempted "to throw important light on the
whole field of international relations" by studying in depth the causes 
of the Great War and of war in general. The actual draft treaty for 
the League was written by Woolf and Sidney Webb after the former had 
completed his study of the causes of war. According to >«oolf, "It was 
the first detailed study of a League of Nations to be published . . .
The Labour Party as a whole was slow to react to the idea of the
creation k? . post-war supernational authority. Any proposal made by 
the I.L.P. or the U.D.C. during the first two and a half years of the 
war was usually ignored by the majority of the party. At its annual 
conferenoo in January 1917, Labour finally passed a resolution "approvin 
the formation of an international league to enforce peace ’on the plan 
advocated by the President of the United States and approved by the 
British Ibreign Secretary.’" Prom then until the end of the war and th 
actual establishment of the League of Nations in 1919> the party worked 
to promote the idea in Great Britain. The League came to be one of the 
primary objectives to be secured at the peace settlement, and both the
1. Leonard 3. Woolf, Beginning Main: An Autobiography of the Years 
1911-lp18 (London: Hogarth Press, 1964)> pp* 183-184; Taylor, The 
Trouble Makers, p. 329*
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Memorandum on ./ar Aims and the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist .memoran­
dum on bar ikims heartily endorsed the development of a supernationai 
organisation. lurthermore, the new Labour Constitution adopted in 
February 1918, supported the League idea by pledging the party«-
To co-operate with the labour and Socialist organisations in
other countries, and to assist in organising a Federation of 
Nations for the maintenance of Freedom and Peace, for the estab­
lishment of suitable machinery for the adjustment and settlement 
of International Disputes by Conciliation or Judicial Arbitration, 
and for such International Legislation as may be practicable.
In 1913 Arthur Henderson wrote a pamphlet entitled The League of 
Nations and Labour in which he gave the two primary reasons why the art; 
had come to support the league. The first was that Labour hoped that
the creating of such an organisation would enable the nations of the
world to reduce their expenditure on armaments so as to permit social
reconstruction on a great scale at the end of the wari-
This is the first and most compelling reason why the organised 
working-class movement supports the proposal of a League of 
Nations. Labour recognises that in this proposal lies the 
hope of deliverance for all the peoples from the severest 
economic pressure and the most terrible risks of suffering and 
loss, from heavy burdens of taxation to maintain large armies 
and navies.
Secondly, the party supported the League because it would help to promot 
’’the Unity of peoples”. The final safeguard of peace as Labour saw it 
lay not in the establishment of machinery for judicial arbitration and 
conciliation of disputes, “but in the spirit of international goodwill
1. Winkler, ’’The Nevebpment of the League of Nations Idea,” JMH, XX, 
108; G.D. 1. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914* P» 73’
and the understanding between nations based upon the essential identity 
of their interests”. These, then, were the two primary reasons why the 
Labour Partr had come to support the League of Nations.
Toward the end of the war, enthusiasm for the League cane to be
linked with the idea of "a Wilson Peace”. Shortly after the President*
speech on January 8th, 1918, enumerating his ’’Fourteen Points”, the
Labour Party, the T.U.C., and the Co-operatives issued a manifesto
welcoming his ’’’authoritative declaration of Allied war aims’”. It
particularly praised his demand for open peace negotiations at the end
of the war. The manifesto expressed Labour’s approval of Wilson’s
attitude toward revolutionary Russia, and it accepted his definition of
freedom of the 3eas. It also endorsed his proposals for equality cf
trade conditions at the end of the war, the evacuation and restoration
of Belgium, and the evacuation of Russian territory. Finally, the
manifesto stated that the programme put fotwrard by Wilson was so si liar
to that adopted by Labour, ’’’that we need not discuss any point of
difference in detail.’” The party wholeheartedly endorsed the idea of 
2peace by negotiations.
The proposals made in Wilson’s Fourteen Points were also approved 
of by the U.D.C., and on October 31st, 1918? the Union passed a resolu­
tion in support of the President’s programme. Thi3 was done shortly
1. .. Arthur Henderson, The League of Nations and Labour (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1918), pp. 4-7*
2. Van der olice, International Labor Diplomac?/ and Peace, pp. 219-20.
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after the President’s reply to the German Government’s request on
October 8th for negotiations for peace to be carried out along the
lines of his stated programme. Not only did the U.D.C. endorse
Wilson’s Fourteen Points, but it also called upon the .ritish Government
"’to take steps in conjunction with its Allies to abrogate all Treaties
and Agreements and reject all proposals which conflict with these
conditions . . . ”’ The month before, the Inter-Allied Socialist and 
1
Labour Conference had also endorsed the Fourteen Points.
On November 3rd, 1913, the -abour xarty held a great demonstratior 
at the Albert Hall which called for a moderate peace along the lines of 
Wilson’s peace programme. The Times in its coverage of the meeting 
printed a copy of the resolution passed theres-
That this mass meeting of workers welcomes the fact that an
opportunity to make a lasting and just peace now appears at 
hand, and de .ands for organised labour an effective voice in 
the peace negotiations. We support as a basis for the settle­
ment the 14 points laid down by President 'Wilson and endorsed 
by Mr. Lloyd George in his speech to the American troops on 
July 15. .,'e also demand that those responsible for crimes
committed against humanity and international law shall be brought 
to the bar of justice, that full reparation and compensation 
shall be paid for injury to life and property on sea and land.
We further demand the repeal of conscription and the restoration 
of civil liberties. 1 2
The resolution is interesting for several reasons. It shows tha< 
Labour was eager to have a part in the actual negotiations of the peace.
1. Swanwich, builders of Peace, p. 113» Brand, "British Labor and 
President .ilson," AHN, XXXVIII, 281.
2. "Labour and Peace, ' The Times, Monday, November 4» 1918; Lloyd 
George Papers, Beaverbrook Library, London, folder no. F/l6O/l/12.
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and that it hoped that peace would he based on Wilson’s fourteen Points. 
(Labour of course was not represented directly at the peace conference, 
because it had withdrawn from the Coalition by that time; and the 
actual treaty itself ignored many of Wilson’s fourteen Points.) It 
also 3hows, however, that the majority of the party still believed that 
Geraany was primarily to blame for the war, and they were eager to make 
her pay for it. After the Treaty of Versailles was signed, Labour’s 
attitude toward Germany became one of sympathy, and the party worked 
actively to try to get the reparations payments reduced.
in its election campaign after the war, Labour again affirmed its 
faith in the peace terms Wilson was proposing. With the failure of its 
more outstanding leaders to secure election to Parliament, however, Laboi 
was forced to turn toward extra-parliamentary action to gain support for 
the peace it wanted to see signed and the -eague it hoped to see estab­
lished. A letter from Lord Bobert Cecil to Lloyd George on December 
19th indicates not only Labour’s enthusiasm for ..ilson and the League of 
Nations, but also the Government’s growing scepticism about Wilsonian 
idealism:-
J.H. Thomas whom I met casually today told me that 
he & his friends are starting a great agitation in favour of 
the League of Nations - Albert Hall Meeting - League of 
Nations Sunday - & all that kind of thing. I hope he will 
not turn it into a glorification of President Wilson & regret 
a little that we have let that eloquent pedagogue ’’patent” 
thi3 question as he has done ....
The Albert Hall meeting on January 3rd, 1919> was the first of a
series of demonstrations by Labour in the larger cities in England and
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Scotland endorsing a Wilsonian peace and the League of Nations. At 
thi3 meeting Labour also declared itself in favour of an end to economic 
warfare, the right of self-determination for all nationalities, open 
diplomacy, and disarmament. These resolutions and others passed at 
later meetings were adopted in behalf of "'a Wilson peace’”, and numeroui 
messages of assurance and support were sent to the President. ihe 
U.D.C. t • month before had reiterated its support for Wilson and his 
programme, aid its executive committee on December 21st, 1918, sent an 
open letter to him outlining what the Union saw as fatal hindrances to a 
just and honourable peace settlement. Sven the socialist press for the 
most part was solidly behind him and his programme. Enthusiasm for the 
President was high in labour and socialist circles when the negotiations 
at Paris opened.^'
then the peace talks began, the first of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 
open diplomacy, was discarded. Labour, however, did not blame the 
President for it but, rather, attributed it to the demands of the French
and Italians to exclude the Central Powers from the negotiations. uhen 
the preliminary draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations was pub­
lished in Fe >ruary, however, it was received with mixed feelings. Some 
saw it as being better than they had hoped for from the statesmen at 
Paris, and for that they thanked Wilson. Nevertheless, vehement
1. Letter from Lord itobert Cecil to Lloyd George sent on December 19, 
1918s Lloyd George Papers, Beaverbrook Library, London, folder no.
5/53 J Van der Slice, International Labor Diplomacy and Peace, pp. 
225-28; Carl F. Brand, "The Attitude of British Labor Toward Presides 
Wilson during the Peace Conference,” American Historical Review, ALII 
(January 1937), 245*
""I.. l;' , — —
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criticism soon arose in every section of the Labour movement not only 
of minor details of the Covenant but even of some of its major features. 
One of the major objections raised was that the League was to be based 
on governments instead of parliaments, thus making it an alliance of 
executives instead of a league of the peoples. Once Labour*s faith 
in Wilson*s ability to deal effectively with the rest of the Allies in 
the negotiations had been shaken, the party never regained its earlier 
enthusiasm, for him.^
On April 3rd, a special conference of the Labour Party and the 
T.U.C. met in London. It was believed that Wilson.was fighting single­
handedly against French, Italian and even British reactionaries who were 
trying to prevent the Covenant from being included in the treaty at all. 
The confere. ce was an attempt to strengthen his hand in the negotiations 
by showing that abour was solidly behind him. Henderson expressed the 
party’s attitude toward the League when he said that support for it was 
a step in the right direction, but that the party could give it only 
nominally because the covenant fell so far short of the expectations 
ai'oused by the statesmen. Twenty-three amendments were then adopted
by the conference which were intended to bring the League more in line 
2with Labour1s ideals. 1 2
1. Ibid., 245-46; Van der Slice, International Labor Diplomacy and 
Peace* p. 228.
2. Brand, ’’Attitude of British Labor toward President Wilson,” JHK, 
XLII, 247-
— — —
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The draft treaty was presented to Germany on May 7th, and the 
next day the Labour Party issued a manifesto on it. While the treaty 
was only partially acceptable to the party, the League of Nations which 
it established might be used to make the necessary corrections to bring
it in line with Labour’s ideals. The I.L.P. on the other hand was
unanimously against the treaty, and on the same day it issued a manifest 
denouncing it as "’a capitalist, militarist, and imperialist imposition’ 
that violated every public statement of Allied war aims’. hile ..ilsor 
prestige was not completely shattered within the Labour Party, it was 
within the I.L.P. In the Bradford Pioneer Jowett wrote of ’’the ’ghastl
failure* of Wilson”, and Snowden in the ^abour Leader went so far as to 
say that ”if he had not brought America into the War a decent peace 
would probably have been secured”.
On Juno 1st the N.E.C. and the P.L.P. issued a joint state;.;...; 
this time strongly condemning the treaty not because it was defective 
in certain particulars, but because it wa3 a basic denial of the 
principles for which the party had fought. The treaty had been con­
structed on the very principles which had caused the war. It violated 
the pledges given by Wilson and the Allied statesmen and stood in sharp
contrast to the war aims Labour itself had outlined.
Later the same month, the party’s annual conference was held at
1. Ibid. ? 250, 252-53; Clynes, Memoirs, I, pp. 283-84; Henry H. 
Winkler, ’’The Emergence of a Labor Poreign Policy in Great Britain, 
1918-1929,” The Journal of Modern History, XXVIII (March, 1956), 248.
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Gouthport. at it a resolution was passed which called for the speedy 
admission of Germany to the Lague of Nations, ’’’and the immediate 
revision by the League of the harsh provisions of the Treaty’” which 
violated the statements made by the Allied Governments at the time the 
Armistice was signed. The resolution further called ‘”on the ^abour 
movement, in conjunction with the International, to undertake a vigorous 
campaign for the winning of popular support for this policy 
Accordin t /-inkier, official party statements at this time on the
treaty ’‘were phrased in terms hardly less damning than those used by
l
the extreme wings of the Labour movement.”
The j-»abour Tar ty and the I.L.P. were not the only organisations ir 
Britain tj criticio the treaty. The U.D.C. also attacked it.
Larch loti h . executive committee of the Union hd sent a resolution to 
Versailles welcoming the adoption of the League of Nations by the .oris 
Conference, but rec aending a number of changes in the Graft Covenant, 
it urged the British 'Government
to endeavour to get the Articles so amended as to secure (l) popu­
lar representation and control in the body of delegates and the 
Council; (2' the right of entrance to the League on equal terms 
for all civilised states; (3) the general abolition of con­
scription; (4) an equal standard for the reduction of armaments, 
together with the abolition of private manufacture and trade in 
them; (p) the extension of the mandatory principle, with the 
‘Open door’ policy, to all non-self-governing colonies and 
protectorates, rnd (6) unanimity in the legislature and adminis­
trative decisions of the League shall not be necessary.
1. Ibid.
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Gn a._ ,?t. the executive committee issued a statement protesting 
against the Treaty of Versailles which it claimed "’violates the terms
and principles on the faith of which, the German nation laid down its 
arms/”. The resolution went on to disparage the territorial arrange­
ments of the treaty ”’particularly as regards the eastern portions of 
the German state, the Gaar Valley and Alsace-Lorraine . . . it also
criticised the severa .ce of Last Prussia fiaa the rest of Germany and the 
inclusion of a large number of German people in the newly-created Plish 
state. According to the Union, the purpose of the treaty was "’to 
reduce the new democratic Germany to the position of a vassal Gtate; 
to render her commercial recovery impossible; to drive her out of
international life; to crush the spirit of her people . . . ’”
In a . iition to the criticism from the Union itself, a number of 
its members also wrote and made speeches deprecating the treaty aai the 
League whic it established. Norman Angell in 1919 wrote an interest­
ing bock entitled he Peace Treaty and the Economic Chaos of Europe whic
dealt solely with the economic effects which the treaty would have on 
Germany. e acknowledged that the case for punishing the German people 
was a very strong one, but argued against ’’the indiscriminate starvatior 
of a whole nation” which would often allow the guilty to escape while 
the innocent suffered. The punitive conditions of the treaty might be 
justified, hut the fact remained that they contributed to the problems
1. Gwanwich, Guilders of Peace, pp. 119-21.
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facing Germany and aggravated the already serious economic conditions «
there. ihe allied peoples would be affected by those conditions, too, 
even if only to a lesser decree than the Germans themselves. Famine 
in Continental ~nrope would be detrimental to the .Ulied economic 
recovery: Germany and Austria could not pay the indemnity or repara­
tions intended to help with the reioration of Belgium and France* 
Britain’s credit would be increasingly disorganised, '’particularly by 
the continual depreciation of the sovereign in terms of the dollar . . .
’’both the material and moral cause of social and political disorder 
would increase, thereby allowing the spread of Bolshevism; famine would 
prove that the war had '’failed to secure either a lasting or a just 
peace . . difficulties in the newly and already insecure states
established by the treaty would be increased. Angell went on to dis­
cuss the dependence of Britain on the stability of Central Europe and 
then to point out just what the treaty actually did to Germany, 
part of the booh dealt with "The Indispensible Treaty Revisions'* which 
ranged from the rapid fixing of a maximum sum for reparations payments
by Germany to the admission of that country to the League of Nations.
In conclusion, he stated that "the Treaty Zwas_y purely repressive, 
punitive, negative". It deprived Germany of the main sources of raw- 
materials for her industry and made no provision to assist her in the 
future regardless of her conduct. Angell’s final words of warning were 
these: "It is the ’just anger that makes men unjust'."^
1. Norman Angell, The Peace Treaty and the Economic Chaos of diurope
(London: The Gwarthmore Press, Ltd., 1919 J> PP* 9-11, 13-17, 13o, lzj
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One of the chief tenets of the J.D.C.’s programme daring the
war had dealt with the idea of disarmament. The Union had hoped that 
the treaty vould call for a general reduction of armaments by all the 
belligerent powers. Therefore, when it was published and revealed 
that Germany alone would be required to disarm, the.spokesmen for the
U.D.C. protested. The unilateral disarmament of Germany became one of
the chief targets of critics of the peace. ..riting in 1921, Charles 
revelyan sai i that the abandonment of the idea of disarmament had been
one of the great st disillusionment8 of the peace for the ordinary man 
and woman.1
while this was undoubtedly an exaggeration of the general atti­
tude in Britain toward disarmament, still the U.D.C., as well a3 the
aabour Partv and the I.L.P., severely criticised the treaty for failing
to deal with it.
Two of the most severe U.D.C. critics of the treaty and the ^eagu<
of Nations were m.D. ^orel and damsay macuonald. Throughout the war 
Morel had argued against Germany’s sole responsibility for bringing in 
the conflict while saying that the allied Powers were equally to blame, 
he had also said that the expropriation of German colonies at the end
of the war would only sow the seeds of future conflict and that the 
best way for the war to end would be inconclusively. In Truth and the
1. Charles Trevelyan, xjoa liberalism to Labour (London: George Allen 
Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 89.
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■■ar, written in ljlu, he had said that conclusive wars i.e>, a war
rhich enables one side to impose its unfettered will upon the other,
means an inconclusive peace." how, in his sequel to that book, Pre-^ar 
Diplomacy - Fresh Revelations, he renewed his attack on French and 
Russian rest msibility for the war and argued that th© peace treaty had 
to be revised and Germany’s sole guilt denied. Before the treaty was 
ever signed, he had protested against the Allies’ intentions of raking
Germany pay for the war and said that the preliminary draft of the ^©agu 
of Nations should be revised to include both Germany and Russia. after
it had been signed and presented to the House of Commons for ratifiestio
on July 3rd, he wrote that the treaty clearly indicated that the motives
of theallied Powers had all along ’’been predatory and sordid’*. efore 
the treaty could be revised, however, the people had to first 'secure 
the demoert tic control over the management of their Affairs . . .
..acJonald, shortly after the war ended, predicted in IheSocialist 
Aeview that the terns of the treaty for Germany would be even worse than 
those which she had imposed on Russia at Brest-Litovsk. The war had 
ended as a purely military conflict and consequently was destroyin the 
political objectives for which the people had fought. Gpeaking to a
gathering of the I.L.P. in Leeds in October 1919? he said that the
1. S.D. Loral, h-.ith and the .'.ar (London: National Labour Press, 1916; 
pp. 27^9 J12; and Pre-^ar Diplomacy - Fresh Revelations <London: 
Independent -abour Party, 19195> pp; 12-14; ’’Making Germany Pay: Mr. 
E.D. Morel Protests,” learning Post 0harch 24? 1919); HAD. Morel, 
"Labour and Foreign Affairs," Daily Herald (July 4? 1919)•
creation of the c lite state© of Poland and Czechoslovakia was a 
mistake, and he protested against the punishment inflicted on Germany.^"
L. abour’s reaction to the Government * a Intervention
in soviet Russia •
fhe oenevolent attitude which British Labour adopted toward 
Soviet Russia during the early days of that republic’s existence has 
sometimes been seen as being diametrically opposed to the party’s pre­
vious declar tions in favour of parliamentary action to achieve its
acknowledged goals. it is impossible to determine whether Labour’s 
support for the Joviet Union during the last year of the war was largely
a by-product oi its own growing independence, or .vhether its independ­
ence was si plt,. increased by the party's enthusiasm for the new soci..lie- 
State* After the war, however, the Labour Part 3 • •
concerned with the Government’s interventionist policy in Russia, not 
so much because that policy was aimed at destroying Bolshevism, but
because it was also an attempt to destroy socialism in that countr/ whic
the Bolsheviks claimed to be establishing. Labour had just acknowledge1 
its own socialist aims in its new constitution in 1918, and if the 
British Government was determined to crush it abroad, it would certainly
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1. J. Ramsay mac Jonald, ’’The ’Socialist Review* Outlook,” The socialist 
Review <January-i.'iarch, 1919)J ”mr. LacLonald in Leeds. ‘Bankrupt 
Statesmanship,”' forkshire Herald (October 20, 1919)*
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do everything in its power to prevent its spread at home.
The invasion of Goviet Aussiu by British and French troops on 
April 2nd, 1913, had a profound effect on Labour. According to at 
least one Labour historian, it further alienated the party from the
Government on the one hand and caused the consolination of all the
revolutionary forces in Britain on the other. The British Govern ent
justified t >o invasion by sayin that the 3tock-piles of Allied war
materials in Aussia must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the
Germans. indeed, this was probably the original concern of the Allies
when they invaded. The trade unions did not approve of the action,
but seeing the necessity for it, they remained silent on the issue. -d
the end of the war, however, the unions came more and more under the
influence oi the minority sections in the party which had been a it tin 
against intervention from the beginning.^
#ian tl e war ended, the British Government continued its policy oJ 
intervention in .ussia. The Labour Party was not alone in objecting 
to this. Aveu before the Armistice had been signed, the U.D.C. h.l
called for the withdrawal of all Allied troops from Aus3ia. The onion 
now protested .against the continuation of the blockade of that country 
and the supply of war materials, money, and troops to help the anti­
Bolshevik forces. Many °f ihe U.D.C.’s members at this time shifted
their alle ,i uco from the Liberal Party to the labour Party because the;
1. Jrton, abour in Transition, pp. 138-143 Graubard, British -xioour 
and the Aussian devolution, p. 63 •
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viewed tie Government' 3 -olicy as being anti-democratic and in violation 
of the ideals for which Liberalism had stood in the past."^
marine the spring of 19T9> the Triple Alliance - an association 
of the .miners, railwaymen and transport workers anions formed shortly
before the war - became concerned with British intervention in kussia.
The more radical anion leaders denounced the Government’s policy not
because they felt any sympathy for the Bolsheviks, but because they were
opposed to seeing the revolution in kussia suppressed by capitalist
governments. "Boviet kussia had become for both heft and kijht a
symbolic issue, the right of a.ny working-class movement to ,.ork out its 
2
own destiny free from outside intervention." In April the Triple 
Alliance de n led that the I.L.P. call a special conference to disc ss
what action •; orid be taken to force the Government to withdraw British
troops fro. cussia. At this time, however, the P.L.P. was dominated by 
right-wing . .s, and refused to call a conference.
the .uuoour Party’s annual conference at Bouthport in June, a 
resolution was put forward demanding "direct action" against further
Government intervention. A few of Labour’s k.P.s hastened to defend
the constitution and refused to give countenance to a general strike to
achieve political ends. several of the delegates said that such action
1. Bwanwic - -uildero. of Peace, pp. 124-25; Graubard, British Labour 
and the kussi an .neviL it ion, p. 63.
2. Hock, . li'j an Hmes of nmest Bevin, I (Londons Hllia
Heinemann, Ltd., 19^0)', p. 103.
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was defensible on the grounds that the party after the election in
December 1 L .ad said that the Government had deceived and lied to
the electorate. Therefore, they contended, Labour had the right to 
take any action necessazy to get rid of such a Government which had 
come t; power through fraud and deceit. The conference finally 
decided, however, that only the unions could resolve the question of
direct action.
After the Southport Conference, therefore, the Triple Alliance 
held a meeting at Caxton fall on July 23rd and decided by a vote of 
217 to 11 to take the matter into its own hands. It was agreed that 
a paper ballot should be sent to each neuber of the unions to determine 
if a general strike should take place. Before this wa3 done, ho /ever, 
Churchill, t ecretary for Aar, announced in the house of Com .ons tha 
all ritis. troops would be withdrawn from Russia by the end of the 
autumn. Conseq ently the ballot was called off. By autumn most of 
the troops hud been withdrawn and the supplies which the Government had 
been shipping to the anti-Bolshevik forces gradually stopped.1
on January 29th, 1920, a manifesto - ‘'Complete ana Immediate 
Peace with tl 2 Boviets" - was issued by twenty-one trade union officie 
to the general public. The officials represented both the political 
and industrial arms of the working-class movement. lifter denying any
1. Taylor, h e -'rouble -akers, p. 147J Bullock, Jrnest Bevin, I, 
pp. 105-06; Taylor, onglish history, p. 133*
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sympathy with the political theories of the soviet Government, they 
proceeded to disc <ss the reasons why they favoured complete and immedi­
ate peace with Russia. first of all, it could not be denied that the
Joviet military ..ad been successful in the past in defeating the anti­
. i It noty op ■
t t a large number of Russian officers who had served under the old
regime were directing the Joviet armies. If the accusations th. t they
were being forced by terrorism to lead these annies was true, then why 
did they continue to win campaigns* ”If men and officers alike arJentl 
desire, as we are told, the overthrow of the Joviet power, why do they
so consistently defeat the ’deliverers* who would accompli.h it':”
secondly, the trade union officials were opposed to war with
Russia been . e it would be a war against the itussian people thenseuves, 
not merely against a tyrannical Government. It would be the Russian 
peasants, the Russian women and children who would suffer the moat, 
furthermore, even though it might be argued that Bolshevik propaganda ir 
Asia was a justification for intervention, still ''the expenditure of 
British resources in enabling a bankrupt Roland ... to carry on a 
long and costly Russian campaign would not increase our economic capa­
city for f seeing trouble in our own Asiatic umpire. Nor would the 
military success of the campaigns so subsidised necessarily stop the 
propaganda an agitation." liven if the Roles should capture L.oscov., 
the Bolshevik leaiers v/ould simply flee into the Near or far fast and
there continue to spread communism.
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Ime anion officials went on to suggest a policv. of complete peace 
with iiuasia as the most expedient course to follow:-
if it be true that the soviet Government has really failed to 
reconcile its people, and still imposes its power over a 
territory and population as great as the united states merely 
by tyranny, it must be because the peoples are cowed and 
spiritless by privation and hunger. A state of war will 
>erpetuate that condition, and will do so even though the 
blockade be raised. A state of war, raoi'eover, increases the 
autocratic powers of the Government, even as it does in the 
..estern democracies. Peace would mean a greater chance of food 
and normal resistance to tyranny. And that revival would mean 
the confronting of the Soviet 'Government, always supposing that 
its power r sts upon force and terror, with problems nearer at 
home than propaganda in India and Asia *.JLnor.
Ihe manifesto ended by stating that the results of the war1 just 
ended and the victory just gained would be endangered if Britain inter­
vened in the Aussian-Polish dispute. Therefore, the union officials
pledged themselves to oppose Britain's entry into a war between the two
countries siould one begin. Among the twenty-one delegates signin
the manifesto were J .A. Clynes, John uodge and J.H. Thomas.
In April Poland invaded Russia, launching an attack in the Ukraine
shortly after the invasion, the Labour Party issued a statement of its
own policy toward Russia - Labour's Russian Policy. It discussed whai 
the party t ought were the three major aspects of the Russian situ .tion:
Poland and the eastern Border Gtates; the middle mast; the Blockale.
1. Labour' A.an Policy: Peace with Soviet Russia: see the .appendj
"Complete .ui.; Immediate Peace with the Soviets! ' The manifesto was 
addressed to the public by the trade union officials on January 29th, 
1920.
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In view of t.icse aspects of the situation, the party proposed a 
four-point policy. first, there should be a 'Complete raising of the 
Blockade and a complete peace with Hussia." formal recognition of the 
Soviet Government "would no more imply moral approval of it than did 
our formal recognition of the Tsar s Government". in raising the 
blockade, no restrictions or controls should be applied to kussia which 
did not apply to other countries trading wi1h Britain.
secondly, Poland and the Border States "should be encouraged to 
make peace with Russia on the basis of mutual disarmament". Britain 
should immediately make it clear to xoland that all assistance and suppor
to her would be cut off if she continued her attack on kussia. further
more, financial and economic assistance to the eastern Juropean states
"should be .ado conditional on guarantees that such assistance is not 
used for tn purposes of armaments and military adventures'.
kext, attempts to attack kussia in the Middle hast should be 
immediately abandoned. This would include a reversal of the Govern­
ment’s attempt to set small Jtates in that area against kussia. ~n 
attempt should be .ade to reach a settlement and agreement with soviet 
kussia; Britain should ’’attempt to encourage a peaceful settlement of 
all questions between the states of the kiddle hast”} the Government 
should aoandon its imperialist policy in the kiddle uast, revise the 
treaty wit; Jersia, am reconsider its policy in Mesopotamia. f'he 
fourth proposal made stated that the Laeour Party should 'resist and
oppose, by every means in its power, war, or an attempt to create a war,
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between this country and Russia."
The Polish invasion had again raised tne question of British 
intervention in ^ussia. On 8th, the foies captured Kiev, and zvto
days later the nondon dockers protested against nritish intervention
by refusing to coal the Jolly Geor,;e until the munitions stored on
board it and destined for rola n< were removed. Later than month ..ac-
Jonald, writing in forward, justified the action arbitrarily taken on
behalf of the nation because it represented a protest against the
Government’s policy of war with Russia. The League of Nations, he
said, should invoke Article 18 of the Gove iant and demand an immediate
cessation of the rolish offensive
if the League were worth it3 salt it would go further.
It would take cognisance of the repeated offers of peace made 
by the Aussian Government, and if it could do no more it could 
record thorn with approval and thus help the common people into 
sanity and a.per the vindictive politicians and militarists ...
T _e initial success of the Polish invasion was reversed early in 
June, and on the 13th the Russians recaptured Kiev. When it beca e 
clear that they might actually defeat Poland, the British Government 
stepped in and proposed an armistice. Russia initially rejected the 
proposal, but later she reversed her decision and entered into negotia­
tions at .ainsk. The talks broke down on August 1st, however, and whei 
Russia ref sed to stop her attack on Poland, the British Government
1. labour’j pnssian rolicy, p. 4­
2. G.B.H. Cole, a History of the abour Party from 19,14» P* 104>
J. Ramsay -acuonald, “The Jolly, Jolly George,” forward g~ay 22, 1^2!
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threatened to intervene directly • This threat was sufficient to 
persuade the aoviets to reopen the negotiations.
Labour was afraid that the Government would involve the country in
a war with Kussia, and August 9th a joint meeting of the L.-.C., the 
T.J.G. Parliamentary Committee, and the P.L.P. passed a resolution 
warning the Government "’that the whole industrial power of the organise 
workers zjvould_^ be used to defeat this war'". It went on to propose
an immediate National Conference in London which would have the autho­
rity to advise the workers to "down tools" if war should threaten. To 
see that these steps were carried out a Council of Action was then
appointed b„. the meeting.
The xi'ational Conference which the joint meeting had proposed met
on the 13th at central nail. Three resolutions were presented and Gael
was passed unanimously. 'The first approved the earlier action taken
at the joint meeting, and it recognised the appointment of a Council of
action to ;,ork against the Government's policy toward the xiusso-xolish
war. The second resolution welcomed the xtussian Government's offer
earlier in the month of complete independence for Poland as set for h
in its Peace Terms to that country, and it instructed the Council of
Action to star in being until it had secured
(l an absolute guarantee that the armed forces of Great 
<ritain shall not be used in support of Poland, Baron Wrangel, 
or any other uilitaiy or naval effort against the Soviet 
Government.
(2,’ I. e withdrawal of all British naval forces opex’a- 
ting directly or indirectly as a blockading influence against
iins si a •
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(3? the recognition, of the Russian Soviet Government
and the establishment of unrestricted trading and commercial
relationships between Great Britain and Russia.
It went on to state that the conference refused to be associated with
any alliance which committed Britain to support h.rangel, Poland, or 
the supply of munitions or other war material for any fon of attack 
upon soviet Lussia.” finally, it authorised the Council of Action to 
do anything it thought necessary to achieve the foregoing policy and 
called upon the rest of the labour movement to be prepared to assist 
the Council in preventing the country from becoming involved in w r.
The third and final resolution recommended that the Parliamentary 
Committee of the T.U.C. raise a special fund to meet the requirements of 
the Council of Action3
.Ate.,. th- national Conference had adjourned, local Councils of 
Action sprang up throughout the country. The labour Party was deter­
mined to prevent the country from going to war, and consequently it 
never stopped to question the constitutionality of its action. a rliei 
doubts about the legitimacy of using industrial threats to secure 
political o J actives were ignored or overlooked. The reluctance i;
had shown the year before to organise the workers against the Govern­
ment’s Russia policy dissipated in the wake of what Abour saw as an
1. G.D.H. Cole, x .iistory of the haboux* Party from 1>14» PP« 104-06; 
Report Q- -pocial Conference on Labour and the Russian-Polish
war, found in the D.R.: Graubard, British Labour and the Russian 
Revolution, pp. 105-06.
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even more serious threat to peace.
The d lire for oeace in Britain was by no means limited to the 
Labour Party. Had the public at large believed in war with I-tussia, 
undoubtedly it would have occurred. The only reason that Labour 
stood out amid3t the general discontent with the Government’s policy 
was because it was the largest, and perhaps the strongest and boot 
organised, bod; in Britain which was in a position to do so. "La ar, 
for one moment, represented the nation in its desire to keep the
peace.
1 • lb ip •, p • 112. 
2. Ibid., p. 113.
CONCLUSION
The formation of British Labour’s foreign polio;, between 1>14 and l.;2o 
was largely due to external events beyond the party's control. . the
Great ..ar never occurred, Labour would have been much slower to work
out an official position on foreign affairs. Lven at the end of the
war, the Labour rarty had no coherent, definitive policy. It was
however, moving in the general direction of one. The war had shake.< 
the party from its general disinterest in foreign affairs, and at its 
conclusion an effort was L to construct a foreign policy*
nefore the war, the Labour movement had been concerned primarily
with the representation and protection of the economic interests of the 
working class. the foreign policy which it had followed, however vas 
closely akin to bladstonian liberalism ;v. supra, p. l). Labour 
favoured a concert of ^urope rather than a balance of power built up
on alliances between the countries. furthermore, the arbitration of
disputes wa^ held in preference to their settlement through armed
conflict.
..hen the L.A.C. was founded in 1900, the Liberal Party had just 
split over ts attitude toward the Boer war. The majority of Labour 
followed t. Io d oi the I.L.P. and joined with the “pro-Boer” Liberals 
in denounci:, the Government’s policy in couth Africa. The Pabian
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^ocietg on ; .0 other hand oenerally supported the position taken up 
hj the Conservatives and 'Liberal imperialists’. But at the end of 
the war, Laoo.tr was still not sufficiently interested in foreign affairs 
to work out a policy of its own <pp. 2-4? •
-hough a .in t-> Gladstonian foreign policy, Labour’s own pro-r 
foreign policy was more than just an extension of it. in place of 
non-intervention in Luropean affairs, a policy of internationalism wan 
adopted. ..hen the party applied for membership of the second Inter­
national, in 19^4, it pledged itself to follow the policies advocated 
by that organisation. in 191C this pledge came to include the Copen­
hagen resolution (pp. 5-7;• thus, the party’s pre-war foreign policy 
can best be .escribed as a blend of Gladstonian Liberalism and inter-
nationalis- .
Burin ■ the days immediately preceding and following the actual 
start of the dreat ».ar, the Labour Party's attitude toward the Governmei 
and the war itself was quite fluid. on July 30th the P.L.P. passed a 
resolution commending drey on his attempt to get Austria and terbia to
settle their dispute peacefully. fwo days later, xiardie and Henderson
issued a manifesto on behalf of the British section of the Intemationaj
urging the people to hold vast demonstrations in Britain against war.
On August 3--’d Grey revealed in the House of Commons that the country
was morall, Pound to come to the aid of Prance and -uussia if war should
break out. fter the other parties had endorsed the Government’s
position, ^acoonald rose and expressed Labour’s disapproval of the
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Gover . t foreign policy in the past and the position which it was 
now adopting in toe present situation. fhe actual invasion of Belgium 
was not known at the time and the P.L.P. gave tacit approval to its 
Chairman's speech -vpp. 7-9 )•
..hen the invasion of Belgium became public, the majority of toe 
Labour Party gradually came round to approvin0 the Government's position 
initially, however, the party gave only qualified support to the war 
effort. on august >th, the P.L.P. issued a statement condemning the 
Government's former policy of secret diplomay which Lad involved the 
country in war, but statin,, that it would do nothing to hinder the ..ar 
effort. do negative support given by the P.L.P. was followed two 
days later by a part,.* circular which condemned the foreign policy of
Grey and tf government and pledged the party to seek to procure peace 
at the earl io s ossible moment (pp. 11-12;.
f'he initial reluctance of the Labour Party to support the Govern­
ment in the prosecution of the war can perhaps be explained by its 
allegiance to the second International. during the early days of the
war, the party prosably hoped that the International would do something 
to bring the conflict to a fast conclusion. Labour's faith in the
international soon died, however, and its death was followed by the
unions' agree ent on ugust 24th to an "industrial truce" and the 
party's plod, e on august 29th to support the Parliamentary Recruiting 
Campai ,n ind t a ide by an elect roe during the war. -xarl in
September, the Joint roard of the Labour warty issued a pamphlet
— ■ ■■" - . . ' - - ' . .. . —
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entitled II- .rl^luu ^bour .movement and tni; .>ar wiiich set forth the
official position of the Joint Toad and that adopted by the T.U.C. and 
the G.i.T.d. toward the war. finally, on October 15tn, the r.L.P., the 
T.J.C. and the u.-.T.'J. issued a manifesto which stated the party’... 
position toward the conflict and placed the entire blame for the war on 
the German Government (pp. 13-19).
,»hile the Tabian Society made no early pronouncement on the war,
the I.L.P. did. On August 13th it issued a manifesto stating its 
opposition to the war. The I.L.P.’s attitude toward the conflict was 
comprised of many nuances of opinion. some of its members were purely 
pacifist while others sere in favour of national defence. ..hile they 
were not agreed as to just why the war should be opposed, they were 
unanimous in their opposition to it (pp. 20-23..
The L.d.x. - at first adopting a pro-war stance and then suifting 
to an anti-war one in the spring of 1916 - had very little influence on 
the actual formation of .Labour’s foreign policy during the war. ft was 
loosely associated with the party, however, wnen the war began, and in 
1917 its application for membership was accepted at the party’s annual 
conference at Manchester. The fact that its application was approved 
by the part early in 1917 despite its hostile attitude toward the war 
indicates t x degree of tolerance, perhaps, which thqpajority section oi 
the Labour -art, had for the minority position
It was the j.T.C. which had the greatest influence on the develop*
bhile thement of the Labour Party’s foreign policy during the war.
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I.L.P. was unequivocally anti-war, the Union was not. ihe attitudes 
of its members varied considerably, but they were united in their 
opposition to secret diplomacy and the concept of the balance of power* 
furthermore, they were convinced that a lasting peace could be achieved 
only throu x negotiations by the belligerents, not by total victory on
one side or the otbsc.
ihe U.D.C. stood somewhere between the fervid pro-war position 
which the Labour Party exhibited during the first two years of the war 
and the ardent anti-war position which the I.L.P. adopted early on in 
the conflict. on the one hand, the Union offered an alternative to 
the party’s staunch s port for the Government’s war policy and, on the 
other, it prevented in the I.L.P. the development ojysrhat might have 
become a pu .1 • negative, nihilistic anti-war policy. In a real sense 
the J.D.C. served as a link between the two diametrical positions 
adopted by the Labour movement during the early years of the war. It 
is significant that as the war progressed a number of Fabians joined 
the Union. rad the U.D.C. not existed, the formation of the Labour 
Party's foreign policy would undoubtedly have followed a different 
course. It seems unlikely that the party would have taken it upon .
itself to ;,ork out an alternative policy to the one pursued by the 
Government, and in all likelihood Labour would have stuck closer to it 
original fi. ;.ht-to-the-finish position. Furthermore, the rupture betwe 
the Labour Party and the I.L.P. might well have been reached during the
war years.
----------- ----------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The fact that the x^abour Party did not split but maintained a 
fair decree of unity during the first two years of the war can be attri­
buted also tn t io early formation of the . .C. ..hile tne organisa­
tion was concerned primarily with the domestic problems created by the 
war, nevertheless it served as a common meetiiv *d on which the 
pro-war labourites could meet . 12-13)* furthermore, tliere was uevea 
really a concerted effort on the part of the pro-war majority to oust 
the minor! t., from affiliation with the party. After the war began, 
h'.G. Anderson was allowed to remain as chairman of the J.L.C., and other
members of tie I. . • . wno were members of that Labour organ also retain©* 
their positions. .nsn loir Hardie died in. 1915, Jowett immediately took 
his place on the 1T.3.C. hamsay .MacDonald was e/en allowed to continue 
as the part * s Treasurer during the war.
it was the willingness of the majority to ignore the anti-war 
policy of the r.L.x . and later on the D.J.?. which was largely respon­
sible for labour's unity during the war. The loose federal structure 
of the party’s constitution before 1913 also played a part. ..hile the 
pro-war majority and the anti-war minority were constantly at odds over 
such questions as the recruiting campaign and the constitutionality of 
the party’s joining with Liberals and Conservatives to form coalition 
governments, still each section seemed to know just how far it could 
antagonise t - oti or and always stopped just before a complete rupture
could manifest itself.
During the first two and a half years of the war, the Labour x art;
...................
- lib -
adhered /exp closely to the policv outlined by the Government in its 
conduct oi the war. unite the party did temporarily sever its 
connection with the asquith Coalition early in l^lb when the first mili­
tary service ill was introduced in the House of Commons (pp. 4^-40, 
for the most x..:t it was content to luiluw the . the uovem ont.
After the formation oi the Lloyd George Coalition in recember lpl6, 
however, Labour sio zly began to assert its independence. it was no 
longer-n kind of left wing of the Liberal Party as it had been in the 
Asquith Coalition. The party assumed in the Government something 
approaching arit, wit, tie Lloyd George and Conservative groups largely 
because the official Lib sal Party was now in ’’passive” opposition to 
the Government sp. p6'.
the aussian devolution had the initial effect oi increasing the 
party’s enthusiasm for the war. The conflict which Labour had felt 
over lighting lor democratic ideals alongside a despotic ally w-^s 
resolved. i*n_taermore, America’s entry into the war in April also 
reassured t-;.e party of the righteousness of the cause for which the 
Allies were fighting.
hot only was pro-war sentiment stimulated in Britain by the 
Hussian devolution, but anti-war feeling both at home and abroad was 
too. In j, the Lutch-Gcandinavian Committee was formed to promote an 
all-incl sive socialist conference at Stockholm to discuss war aims. 
About this time, the Betrograd Soviet also issued nn invitation to th© 
belligerents and neutrals to gather at Stockholm to prepare a statement
-------------------------------------------
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of war aims. ihe conference which the aoviets were proposing was to 
be binding jri participants. Coon, the two groups merged their 
plans and began to work together to promote the conference <pp. 6C-o2>.
The anti-war groups in Britain had also been encouraged by the 
Russian Revolution. Burly in hay the i.n.r. anu the L.C.P. formed the 
United socialist Council for the purpose of promoting a conference in
June at Leeds to welcome the revolution. Before the convention w... s
held, the council received an invitation from the Petrograd Coviet to 
send a delegation to Russia to uiscuss the Stockholm proposal. ihe 
X.L. . and the B.3.P. each appointed delegates, and the Labour Party, 
which had earlier app< i med a delegation of its own, agreed that the 
groups should travel together.
ihe Leeds Convention on June 3rd, 1917> was undoubtedly the zenith 
of the anti-war movement in Britain. It momentarily shook the Govern­
ment, and at least one member of the Labour Party (Beatrice ..ebb/ t ough 
that it might mark the beginning of the end for that party in Britain, 
xxfter the convention ended, however, the failure to establish soldiers’ 
and Workmen’s Councils in the country and the failure of the delegation 
to leave Ab jrdeen for Petrograd led to the quick dissipation of the 
revolutiona . Be vour w ich had momentarily gripped the anti-war groups 
(pp. 63-66;.
It wau the Stockholm proposal which really began the move by the 
Labour xart to &rd independence and the acceptance of the idea of a
negotiated peace. While the formation of the Lloyd George Coalition
______ ____________ - .... - _
had achi vcm for labour something like equal status in the Government,
still the party continued to follow the policy set forth by the Govern­
ment. The thought of opposing the Government *s fight-to-the-finish 
policy nevei’ occurred to Labour’s leaders. After th^irovisional
Government in hussia issued its statemsn- in 1..; r of a negotiated 
peace with inde .aities or annexation, the leaders of the party began 
seriously to consider this approach to ending the war. With Henderson1 
’conversion to the Stockholm proposal, the idea of a negotiated peace 
really gained impetus; and when he was disgraced by the Government and 
forced to resign from the bar Cabinet, Labour’s move toward independence 
was accelerated (pp. o7-72).
Henderson perhaps more than any other person was responsible for 
Labour’s growing inc^pendence and gradual acceptance of most of the 
U.D.C.’s principles. He had been a member of the Gnion almost from 
its inception in the autumn of 1914* Only after he joined the Asquith 
Coalition li.i 'ne relinquish his ties with the Union. While he ma” -<t 
have re-established himself in the U.D.C. after his resignation from 
the Government, he did begin to encourage the Labour Party in the 
direction of its principles. The result was a compromise of L,e our’s 
early oro-rar position with the policy of the U.D.C. The Aires ox 
Labour is p.. r ips the best analysis of the gradual blend of the two 
policies to for a new base foe the Labour Party’s foreign policy towar 
the end of 1 17. It was the .lemo random on bar Aims, however, whic- ha 
the greatest influence on the actual transformation of that policy. I
_________________
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revealed th<it tne trade anions themselves had at last come to accept 
the idea of a negotiated peace along the lines of the one whioh the 
Jnion was advocating in it3 progamme (pp. 75—79)•
at t c Labour Party annual conference at Nottingham in January 
1913, the and other left-.ing groups attacKeu the Coalition and
urged the party to withdraw fro,a it. Henderson and the N.L.C. agreed 
that in the future the party should not join in a coalition government 
unless it was in control, but they urged the conference not to demand 
Labour’s withdrawal from tne present Government because that would 
automatically precipitate a general election which would interfere with 
the international move .• it for a people’s peace which was just getting 
under way. Instead of a new resolution supporting the coalition, t;,e 
resolution passed the previous year was simply voted on again and, by 
a sizeaoiy gonity, the party decided to remain in the Coalition. xh< 
refusal to vote on a nexv resolution supporting the Government, however, 
revealed the widening gap between Labour and the Coalition. *-.t tne 
conference, ^resident .dlson’s newly-acclaimed fourteen Points were 
heartily endorsed by the delegates (p. 795 -
The next major stop by the party toward independence was taken at 
its conference in o:une 1913* There, the delegates decided to end the 
electoral truce and to contest any seats which might become vacant.
This did not mean, however, that Labour was withdrawing from the Coali 
tion, bat it did ttean that the party was becoming even less restrain, 
in its actions outside oi it \>pp. 82-83•
MM_________ _____________
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Th ee days after tne signing of the Armistice on November XIth, 
the labour xarty at a special conference at Central nail voted to 
withdraw from the Government and to oppose it in the General flection 
which would undoubtedly soon follow. ihe overwhelming majority of the 
party was in favour of ending the party‘s ;ies ..i. the Coalition. In 
the “Khaki ’ election in December, Labour increased its representation 
in the Commons from 42 to 62, but unfortunately its more articulate 
leaders were defeated. Therefore, Labour’s opposition to the eace 
treaty and the League of .ions which it was to establish had to co;-e 
pri larily fro outside Paiiament (pp. 33-34)•
ahe development oi the League of Nations idea in Great oritain 
during the war had a deep influence on the formation of Labour’s ioreigi 
policy. .hxile the fabian Bociety, the I.L.P. ano members of the J.u.G 
had been early supporters of the idea, the Labour Party refused to 
endorse the League until its annual conference in January I>1?. -ven 
then, Labour approved of the League only if it was established along 
the lines of the plan advocated by - resident oilson and approved by the 
British foreign secretary (pp. 85-88). Ihe party was still reluctant 
to show much sympathy for the ideas being promoted by the J.B.C. and 
the I.L.P. ..iter the Russian devolution, however, and Labour’s con­
version to a oace by negotiation, the League came to be one of the 
primary objectives which the party hoped to see achieved at the end of 
the war. in both the Memorandum on bar Aims aid the Inter-Allied 
nabour and socialist memorandum on Jar aims the League of nations idea
______________ - ____
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received enthusiastic support.
Luring the v/ar, the Labour Party let it be known that it expected
to receive direct representation at the peace tals. when the part •* 
joined the second Coalition, apparently some kind of assurance was given 
by Lloyd George that its representatives would be included in an 
British delegation w.iich attended a peace conference at the end oi the 
war (p. 55. • ••hen the peace delegation went to Paris in 1915, however, 
a Labour representative did not accompany it. True, the Labour reorese 
tative who had succeeded Henderson in the ..ar Cabinet, George N. Barnes, 
went with the British delegation. But by this time Barnes had left 
the Labour Party. in f._cb, in his autobiography, he says that he had 
left .the party before it ever withdrew from the Coalition and that a 
Labour candidate was even run against him at Glasgow in the General 
election the Labour Party did not have direct representation at the 
Paris peace conference. Perhaps it had forfeited this righc when it 
withdrew from the Coalition. at any rate, it seems highly probable 
that had Labour been given a part in making the peace, it would not 
have attacked the treaty and the league of Nations as vehemently as it 
did. Perhaps, too, the party’s foreign policy would have matured at 
an earlier date? thu3 enabling Labour to make a more effective contribu 
tion in the area of foreign affairs in the early 192Cs.
— - —---------------
1. George -. Barnes, ero.n workshop to «ar Cabinet (London; Herbert 
Jenkins, Ltd., 1924), PP* 200-201.
— —
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7he draft treaty was presented to Germany on —ay 7th, and on the 
next day Labour issued a manifesto stating that it was only partially 
acceptable to the party. It was, however, recognised that the 
League of Nations might be used to make the necessary corrections in 
t; e Treaty. Labour’s reluctance t: e 'o-.ty in its entirety
soon passed, and on June 1st the N.I.C. and the P.L.P. issued a joint 
statement saying that it was a basic denial of the principles for wi ich 
the party had fought. Later that month at the party’s annual con­
ference at Southport, a resolution was passed calling for the speedy 
admission of Germany to the League and the immediate revision of the 
harsh provisions of the Treaty which violated Allied statements mad©
at the time of the Armistice. The resolution also called for the
party to undertake in conjunction with the International a campaign to 
win popular support for thi3 policy, (pp. 95-96). Official party 
statements on the Treaty at this time were almost as vituperative as
were those issued by the extreme wings of the Labour movement. fur­
thermore, the party’s attitude toward the League of Nations became 
increasingly hostile. In criticising the League, Labour in its 
pamphlets an- speeches portrayed it "as a new alliance, designed to kec 
the ex-enemy countries subjugated and the Allied Powers - especially 
France and Great Britain - firmly in control of the future of Europe.'
1. Henry ..inkier, "The emergence of a Labor foreign Policy in 
Great Britain, 1913-1929," American Historical Aeview, XXVIII 
(liarch 1957), 243*
.......... ..........................
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The u.J.C. severely criticised the treaty, too. Norman Angell, 
Charles Trevelyan, m.J. Morel and namsay ^acLonald all wrote and spoke 
against the texms of th© treaty, saying, that it must be revised if a 
lastin^ peace was to be achieved. They were among the more outspoken 
U.D.C. critics of the treaty (pp. 9L-K1/.
Another aspect of Labour's foreign policy during the post-war
period was its attitude toward oovst kussia. ohile the party had 
heartily welcomed the deposition of the Czar in kussia in the spring of 
1917, it had been slower to greet the Bolshevik revolution later that 
year. The acknowledged socialist aims of the Bolsheviks were commended 
by the majority of the art f, but ik;e means which the new rulers in 
kussia were employing to establish them were generally deplored in Laboa,
circles. it was the Allied invasion of kussia which gradually orj_vght
Labour round to enthusiastic support for the Soviets.
kt first the majority of the abour Party accepted the British 
Government's reason for the invasion. ike stock-piles of Allied war 
materials could not be allowed to fall into German hands. After the 
war, however,the continuation of the Government’s intervention in kussia 
soon drew severe criticism from the party.
The 1.. .r. at this time was composed primarily of right-wing .k.g 
who were reluctant to take action against the Government’s policy in 
Russia. Indeed, ;any of them were apparently in agreement with that 
policy. On June 14tu, 1919, J.A. Ceddon, one-time President of the
T.U.C., signed a circular letter to Churchill on the need for the captu:
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of Petrogra;. Three months later, on ^eptemoer 4t- , James Bexton and
two other Labour - .a, John Joseph Jones and J.L. Thorne, spoke in a
1
debate in the Commons against negotiations with the Bolsheviks.
hoot of the Labour movement, however was against intervention and
wanted peace with Russia. ..hen the party cotil'erence at oouthport in 
June 1919 failed to take any action against the Government’s polio in 
kussia, the Triple Alliance decided to act on its own to try to get the 
Government to .Jfiidraw British troops from that country. a meeting was 
held at Caxton hall on July j^rd, and it was decided that a postal 
ballot of all the miners, railway-men and transport workers should be 
taken to determine il - 3 eral strike should take place in protest at
the Government’s policy. Before the ballot was taken, however, 
Churchill announced that all British troops would be withdrawn ir,> . 
Russia by the end of the year. 'Thus, a clash between the Triple 
Alliance and tie Government was avoided <pp. 1C3-1C4/*
Jn January 29th, 1920, a manifesto - ’’Complete and immediate 
Peace with the eoviets” - was issued to the general public by twenty-ox 
trade union ofiicials. This presented the arguments a^they saw them 
against intervention in Russia if a war should break out between th.b 
country on the one hand and Poland or other Balkan or Near -ast countrii 
on the other. The .anifesto suggested that complete peace with Russia
1. Letter to C c ill on the need for the capture of Petrograd, dated 
June 14, l'plp, with J.A. Jeddon among the signatories (Lloyd George 
Papers, Beaverbrook Library, i^ondon, folder no. P/9/l/7T? telegram 
from /..........
—
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was the most expedient course to follow. it ended with the union
officials pledging themselves to oppose Britain’s entry in a war 
between Russia and Poland if one should break out (pp. U4-ld6).
in t e spring of 1920 war did break out between those two coun­
tries. Shortly after the Polish invasion o- the J .raine, t e Labour 
Party issued a statement of its own policy toward kuasia - Lao our s 
xuussia i .olicy. it analysed tne three major aspects of the kuaaian
situation: Boland and the Eastern Border states, the middle ^-ast,
the Blockade -.mu went on t propose a four-point policy to achieve 
peace with kussia <pp. I^B-IOQ).
The initial success -f the Polish invasion was reversed earl;, in
June, and it soon became clear that the Russians might actually defeat
Poland. T?e British Government stepped in and proposed negotiations
between the two countries to achieve an armistice. Talks were begin 
at minak earl, in August, but when they failed, Russia refused to stop
her attack a minst Poland. The Britis- government then threatened
direct intervention, and this was sufxicient to persuade the Boviets to
reopen the ne ptiations.
Labou?? /as afraid that the Government would actually involve
Britain in a war with Russia. The prty, reluctant the year before to
... from unknown source to Lloyd George dated September 4, 1919, 
saying th-t Janes ^exton, John Joseph Jones and J.II. Thorn spoke 
in the Bouse of Commioas against negotiations \ith the Bolsheviks 
ikLoyd Jeer ,j x^apers, Beaverbrook Library, london, folder no.
1/12/ 1, 147.
___ _
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tak© industrial actxon to secui’e a political objective, now reacted 
to tnis new threat. A National Conference was held on August ljth 
and it approved the earlier action of the L.L.C., the T.J.G. xarlia- 
mentary Committee and the P.L.P. on the 9th establishing a Council of 
Action to work actively against Lriti^. inters .i 1. This threat by 
Labour along v/ith the public s pport which it commanded was sufficient 
to encourage the Government to back down. A.J.P. Taylor has said 
that Labour’s campaign against intervention won support in Lngland 
proba ly more from war— --ri.iess than from any feeling of solidarity 
with the supposedly working-class government in kussia”.1
b 1 iporuj cognise the link between Labour’s attituue 
toward the ^eague of Nations and its hussiau policy. The Government’s 
refusal to ..efer the question of Poland’s invasion of kussia to „ e 
-League of t one c st further doubto in La-our circles ar tc th- vnLue 
of that organisation. The League came to be seen as "the tool of those 
whose hearts and minds can conceive nothing but war”.1 2 had the League 
oaxen some action to restrain the Polish invasion, Labour might have 
come to support it much earlier in the 192Gs than it actually did
Laoour s foreign policy at the end of the war was in a state of 
flux. indeed, it might well be argued that the policy which the party
1. Taylor, Lp^lish., history, p. 138.
2. . . . 'ward. .'he u'arce of a League”, June 2-bth. 1
uPLhh£h> Beaverbrook Library, London, folio number . 2o3}
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pursued in foreign affairs at tnis time was indeed an irresponsible 
one* fhe threatened strike by the friple Alliance in 1919 and the 
formation of a Jouncil of Action in 192J to dissuade the Government 
from direct action in the Ausso-foliah ..ar tend to substantiate this
accusation.
But labour had just recently become a national party. nefox'e
1,1 it had been merely a loose federation of trade unions and social­
ist organisations. After the war, as new and varied elements - notabl 
radical Liberals from the - came into the part, , its policies
could not help but be in a state of turmoil. Labour hud not had a 
clear-cut, c nerent fe,. r , policy before the war, and until these new 
ideas were absorbed by the party it could hardly be expected to con­
struct one in the i mediate post-war period. fthile it cannot rsvued 
that Labour had a coherent foreign policy at the end of the war. still 
it can be said that by the end of 1920 the party was more fully aware 
of its need for one.
_ _-_________________
—<>arl Lrand in footnote 12, page 27o of his article "The Reaction 
of British Labor to the Policies of President Vvilson during the World 
*<ar, found in Volume X*jI1 oi the -American historical -deyiew, gives the 
first peace programme formulated by the I.L.P. at its annual conference 
athorwich, -april 5-6, 1915:-
"Phe first peace program of the I.L.P. was formulated at th.. ann r 
conference oi upril 5—6, 1915* its four points given below will be 
recognised as essentially the sane as some later advanced by President
V.ilson. rIn order that the peace may be just and lasting the conference 
demands;
\,a) That the people concerned shall give consent before there is 
transfer of territory;
(b) o further treaty, a. reement, or understanding be entered 
into without the knowledge f the people and the consent of Parlia ?nt, 
and macninexg to be created for the democratic control of foreign policy;
(c) Drastic all-round .reduction cf armaments by internal!; .1 
agreement, t ytnor vzith the nationalization of the manufacture of ar a— 
ments, and the national control of the export of armaments by one country 
to another;
(a) ritish foreign policy to be directed in future toward es­
tablishing a feder ation of nations, and the setting up of an Intematiom 
Council, whose decisions shall be public, together with the establiahmenl 
of courts for the interpretation and enforcement of treaties and inter­
na tional 1aw. 5 deport of the Twenty-third .manual Conference of the 
independent ..your Party (1915), p. 38.
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